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Abstract
Researchers in the field of AI and Law have developed a number of computational models of
the arguments that skilled attorneys make based on past cases. However, these models have not
accounted for the ways that attorneys use middle-level normative background knowledge (1) to
organize multi-case arguments, (2) to reason about the significance of differences between cases, and
(3) to assess the relevance of precedent cases to a given problem situation. We present a novel model,
that accounts for these argumentation phenomena. An evaluation study showed that arguments about
the significance of distinctions based on this model help predict the outcome of cases in the area
of trade secrets law, confirming the quality of these arguments. The model forms the basis of an
intelligent learning environment called CATO, which was designed to help beginning law students
acquire basic argumentation skills. CATO uses the model for a number of purposes, including the
dynamic generation of argumentation examples. In a second evaluation study, carried out in the
context of an actual legal writing course, we compared instruction with CATO against the best
traditional legal writing instruction. The results indicate that CATO’s example-based instructional
approach is effective in teaching basic argumentation skills. However, a more “integrated” approach
appears to be needed if students are to achieve better transfer of these skills to more complex contexts.
CATO’s argumentation model and instructional environment are a contribution to the research fields
of AI and Law, Case-Based Reasoning, and AI and Education.
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1. IntroductionResearchers in the field of AI and Law have long been interested in developing
computational models of case-based legal reasoning. While one may think of the law as
a system of rules, attorneys very frequently make arguments based on past cases [45].
“[C]ases are the grist of the legal reasoning mill” [24, p. 11].1 A number of AI and Law
models have captured major aspects of the arguments that attorneys make based on past
cases. The HYPO model focused on the comparing and contrasting of cases in terms of
“Dimensions” in order to generate arguments and explore hypothetical modifications of
a problem [7,8]. GREBE [21] and CABARET [54] gave accounts of the subtle ways in
which skilled attorneys combine reasoning with cases and with statutory rules. BANKXX
modeled the use of case-based reasoning in the context of a search-based approach
to argument construction [55]. These models help to clarify and test hypotheses about
processes of reasoning with cases in the legal domain. They also provide a potential basis
on which to build software applications.
In this paper, we present results from a project investigating whether and how a
computational model of expert reasoning with cases can be used to support computer-
based instruction for beginning law students. In order to support effective instruction, a
model of case-based reasoning must address the types of case-based arguments on which
previous models have focused, such as analogizing and distinguishing cases, citing cases
as counterexamples, and selecting the best cases to cite. But it must address additional
skills that legal experts have and that beginning law students must learn, most importantly,
organizing a written argument based on multiple cases and making arguments about the
similarity of cases. These case-based argumentation phenomena have so far received little
attention in the AI and Law and case-based reasoning (CBR) literature.
The primary claim of this paper is that in order to address these argumentation
phenomena, it is necessary to represent and apply middle-level normative background
knowledge. Constructing such a more complete model presents several challenges. First,
the normative background knowledge must be represented in a suitable format. Second,
methods must be devised that detail how this knowledge can be applied to generate the
various types of arguments mentioned above. With respect to the ways attorneys organize
arguments by issues, the challenge is to produce arguments focused on the main issues
that a given problem scenario brings up, while marshaling the available cases effectively
within this overall structure. The challenge in modeling arguments about the significance
of differences between cases is to apply the background knowledge in a context-sensitive
manner [12,13,40], so that the significance of a given distinguishing factor may vary
depending on the specifics of the cases being compared and the purpose for which
the argument is made. We present an argumentation model that, we claim, meets these
1 Attorneys reason with cases for two main reasons. In some areas of the law, called “common law” areas,
the legislature has not provided a detailed statute. The law in these areas has developed mostly through court
decisions and cases are thus the primary sources of law. Examples of such areas are tort law and contract law.
Even in areas where the legislature has provided a statute, the statute often contains open-textured terms, that is,
terms for which no definition is given but that are too abstract to be applied directly to the facts of a case. Past
cases provide information about how courts have interpreted open-textured terms.
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challenges. It includes a representation of middle-level normative background knowledge
for one area of the law, trade secrets law, in the form of a Factor Hierarchy. Further,
it contains computational methods for using the background knowledge to (1) generate
multi-case arguments organized by issues, (2) make context-sensitive arguments about
the significance of differences between cases, and (3) select the best cases to cite in an
argument. The model has been implemented in the CATO program. To support the claim
that normative middle-level background knowledge is an important ingredient of case-base
legal argument, we present results from an evaluation study that focused on the question
whether the use of the background knowledge may be helpful in predicting the outcome
of trade secrets cases. The claim is relevant to the research fields of AI and Law as well
as CBR.
A second main claim of the paper is that the argumentation model outlined above
can be used to support effective computer-based instruction. More specifically, the
claim is that basic argumentation skills can be taught effectively by an intelligent
learning environment that provides instruction primarily by presenting argumentation
examples. This claim is relevant to the research fields of AI and Law as well as
AI and Education. We present the CATO intelligent learning environment, which
supports practice of theory-testing and case-based argumentation tasks. CATO uses the
argumentation model described above to generate argumentation examples dynamically,
to make argument structure visible, and to reduce some of the distracting complexity
that makes legal research and analysis tasks hard for beginning students. To support
the claim that such an approach can be effective, we present results from an evaluation
study, carried out at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, in which we compared
the effectiveness of instruction with CATO against that of more typical legal writing
instruction.
The paper is structured as follows: First, we discuss the role of background knowledge
in case-based legal reasoning and discuss relevant related research. Next, we present and
illustrate CATO’s argumentation model, focusing on its main innovations: a representation
of middle-level normative background knowledge and methods for using the background
knowledge to make arguments with cases. We present results from a study in which we
evaluated how well the novel methods for reasoning about the significance of differences
between cases can be used to predict the outcome of trade secrets cases, compared to
other CBR methods and inductive learning algorithms. We go on to describe the CATO
intelligent learning environment and the evaluation study comparing the pedagogical
effectiveness of instruction with CATO against that of more traditional legal writing
instruction. We conclude by discussing the implications of these evaluations as well as
the contributions that the work makes to the research fields of AI and Law, CBR, and AI
and Education.
2. Related research in the fields of AI and Law and of CBR
In the current section, we outline the role that middle-level normative background
knowledge plays in case-based legal argumentation. We discuss why modeling the use
of this kind of knowledge is a contribution to the research fields of AI and Law and CBR.
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Although it has been noted that factor-based models of case-based legal argumentation,
such as that employed in HYPO [7,8], lack the knowledge to generate certain advanced
types of legal arguments, those critiques have focused on high-level knowledge about
the policies and purposes underlying the domain [16,17] or knowledge about how the
procedural setting of cases influences their value as precedents [18]. The current work
focuses on the role of a related, but different kind of background knowledge, namely,
middle-level normative knowledge about the meaning of the factors that are used to
represent cases.
An important skill that beginning law students must learn is to organize written
arguments by issues [50]. Attorneys very frequently organize arguments by issues. Courts
explain their decisions in case opinions organized by issues. In the legal domain, as
elsewhere, an issue is a point of contention among arguers. In legal disputes, issues arise
in many different ways. There may be issues as to what the relevant law is, what the facts
of a case are, and how the law should be applied to the facts of a case. Such issues come
from a variety of sources, such as statements of the elements of a claim found in a statute
or restatement, or tests that courts use, which are often found in cases.
Previous research in the field of AI and Law has focused on modeling the processes
that are involved in identifying issues in a legal problem. As Gardner [35] has pointed
out, in order to identify issues, a program must discriminate between what is controversial
and what is obvious and must focus its attention accordingly. Being able to do so is a
hallmark of intelligent argumentation and of intelligence, generally. Previous programs
focused on “issue-spotting” in the domain of contract law [35] and tort law [30], using a
variety of knowledge sources. The current work focuses on how to use cases effectively
in arguments organized by issues, in support of a conclusion that one side or the other
(plaintiff or defendant) should win in a given dispute. As they construct such arguments,
skilled attorneys identify issues that a problem raises, judge the relevance of available
past cases with respect to these issues, and marshal the cases in a variety of argument
moves in order to address a party’s strengths and weaknesses with respect to each issue.
In each of those steps, they draw on middle-level normative background knowledge.
We present a method for organizing Issue-Based Arguments which details how skilled
attorneys use background knowledge as they construct arguments supported by cites to
multiple cases. The method for identifying issues presented here may not be as elaborate
or selective as those of, for example, Gardner’s program, but the method provides a
more comprehensive model of the ways attorneys marshal cases effectively in an overall
argument organized by issues. This method is not specific to any particular area of
the law.
A second important skill that beginning law students must learn is to interpret and
make arguments about the similarity of cases. In adversarial domains such as the law,
opposing parties typically offer competing analogies to a problem. Whether arguers
succeed or fail depends critically on their ability to convince a decision maker (a judge
or court of law) that the precedents they have presented are more relevant than those
relied upon by their opponent. But how to produce such arguments? More often than not,
when comparing a problem and a past case, one sees similarities as well as differences.
The significance of similarities and differences depends on context [13] and should be
interpreted “according to the law” [24, p. 31ff]. But there is no generally-accepted, detailed
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method for weighing the similarities and differences. And “it is most difficult to give
a satisfactory account of what this [that is, the weighing of similarities and differences,
in a context-sensitive manner, and according to the law] might mean in common law
adjudication” [24, p. 31].
Nonetheless, attorneys frequently make arguments in which they assess, characterize,
and explain the significance of similarities and differences between cases in a context-
sensitive manner and in accordance with the law. They do so by drawing on normative
background knowledge, interpreting the meaning of the similarities and differences in
more abstract legal terms. An important aspect of these arguments is the strategic
choice of abstract terms with which to describe and interpret cases. Legal cases can
naturally be described at multiple levels of abstraction. These abstraction levels provide
an important degree of freedom in generating alternative interpretations of cases [44,45].
Legal professionals are adept at exploiting this freedom in making arguments with cases,
characterizing cases as instances of one abstract term or another.
If a computational model is to provide an adequate account of how experts use cases
in the legal domain, they must model the strategic interpretation of cases in support of a
conclusion that they are similar or not. Previous models however have not addressed this
type of argumentation. By and large, they lack the knowledge needed to reason about the
significance of similarities and differences and do not have methods to characterize and re-
characterize cases in order to argue that they are similar or different. The model presented
in the current paper has both. Its Factor Hierarchy provides the normative background
knowledge needed to reason about the meaning of differences among cases. Further,
the model contains heuristic criteria for selecting focal abstractions that specify how to
employ the background knowledge strategically, to characterize and re-characterize cases,
in arguments that distinctions matter or not. These criteria are not specific to any area of
the law. Rather, they capture general ways of making arguments about the significance of
differences between cases. They achieve the context-sensitivity called for by Ashley and
Rissland [13].
In order to produce the strongest possible argument that a given problem should be
decided in a favorable manner, an arguer must not only be able to use available cases
effectively, but must also be able to select the best cases to cite. Existing interpretive CBR
programs have demonstrated various interesting methods for selecting the most relevant
cases. The HYPO program used a most-on-point criterion to find cases with maximum sets
of shared factors, as well as methods to explore how certain hypothetical modifications of
the problem cause the balance of an argument to shift [7,8]. GREBE used a combination of
A* search and structure mapping to evaluate the similarity of cases [21]. For the most
part, these methods have not placed much emphasis on evaluating the significance of
distinctions, Branting’s methods for match improvement perhaps coming the closest. From
a rhetorical point of view, however, it makes sense that the significance of distinctions
should be taken into account when selecting the best cases to cite. After drawing an analogy
between a problem and a past case, an arguer would strongly prefer not to see the opponent
point out that there are significant distinctions. We present a number of novel relevance
criteria that focus on cases that do not have significant distinctions.
Accurate judgment of the similarity of cases is a central concern in CBR research
[40,42]. Smyth and Keane [65] called for deeper methods for similarity assessment and
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demonstrated one approach suitable primarily for problem-solving CBR. In the current
paper, we focus on deeper similarity assessment in interpretive CBR, where it is no
less important than in problem-solving CBR. The arguments about the significance of
distinctions modeled in CATO are a dialectic way to achieve deeper similarity assessment,
in which the similarity of cases is evaluated at multiple levels of abstraction and from
different viewpoints.
Within the field of CBR, a number of advanced techniques have been developed
for reasoning about and explaining aspects of similarity, but none of these methods
quite fit the constraints of adversarial, interpretive CBR. CASEY reasons about the
significance of differences using a causal model of heart disease that by itself is sufficient
to solve problems “from scratch” [41]. Protos, a case-based reasoning program that was
applied to a number of domains including auditory disorders, engages in knowledge-based
explanation of the similarity between cases [14]. TRUTH-TELLER assesses and explains
the similarity or dissimilarity of truth-telling dilemmas using hierarchical background
knowledge that in itself is insufficient to solve problems [46]. ACCEPTER’s abstraction
nets [43] are designed to represent general patterns of explanation and support a wide
range of alternative interpretations of an event (such as the death of a race horse). However,
none of these programs place much emphasis on generating alternative interpretations of a
distinction’s significance, as does CATO.
The methods for reasoning about the significance of distinctions among cases presented
in this paper relate to a second important theme in CBR research, namely, abstraction.
CATO’s methods are designed to model the strategic selection of abstract interpretations
of cases in order to support an argument that they are similar or that they are
different. Abstraction has been used in many phases of the CBR process, including
retrieval, similarity assessment, and adaptation [15,47,69]. The use of abstraction in CBR
approaches to problem solving and planning, often referred to as “stratified CBR”, has
been shown to lead to considerable improvements in efficiency [15,19,22]. But stratified
CBR relies on the ability to define abstraction layers, transform problems with respect
to these layers, and deal with one abstraction level at a time. In the legal domain, one
rarely finds such neatly-ordered layers of abstraction. Much more often, attorneys must
simultaneously oversee multiple levels of abstraction, taking into account that conflicting
evidence may exist for abstractions at different levels. Thus, in case-based legal reasoning
one faces some of the same problems related to the use of abstract terms as are encountered
in conversational CBR [36], although in the legal domain they are compounded by the
adversarial nature of the domain.
3. A representation of middle-level normative background knowledge
In the current and the next three sections, we describe and illustrate the novel aspects of
CATO’s argumentation model. We start with the representation of normative background
knowledge in the Factor Hierarchy. In the next sections we describe and illustrate how this
representation of background knowledge is key to modeling a number of argument types
not previously addressed in AI models of legal reasoning.
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A representation of middle-level, normative background knowledge
A Factor Hierarchy represents domain-specific normative knowledge about the meaning of the factors used
to represent cases. Factors were first used in the HYPO program [7,8].
Methods for generating arguments that use background knowledge
Issue-Based Arguments are multi-case arguments organized by issues; they involve the use of middle-level
normative background knowledge and the use of cases in various argument moves.
Arguments about the significance of distinctions emphasize or downplay the significance of a given
distinction in the comparison of a problem and a precedent case.
Methods for evaluating the relevance of past cases that use background knowledge
There are two main criteria for selecting the best case to cite in an argument, both of which involve the
evaluation of the significance of distinctions. The criteria build on HYPO’s most-on-point criterion [7,8].
Fig. 1. Novel components of CATO’s model of case-based legal argumentation.
The CATO model provides an account of arguments in which two parties argue for a
favorable outcome in a given problem situation, comparing and contrasting the problem
to relevant past cases. The main novel components of the model are listed in Fig. 1. The
model also includes elements from the HYPO model of case-based legal argumentation
developed by Ashley [7,8], such as the use of factors to represent cases and a number of
basic argument moves, such as the analogizing and distinguishing of cases in terms of
factors.2
We illustrate CATO’s argumentation model in the context of a trade secrets problem
based on the Missouri case National Rejectors, Inc., v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1966).
National Rejectors v. Trieman is a dispute between a manufacturer of coin-handling devices
and a number of its former employees who had started a competing business. National
Rejectors, Inc. complained that its former employees had misappropriated its designs for
coin-handling devices, which it claimed were trade secrets. A short summary of the facts
of the case is shown in Fig. 2, on the left. Trade secrets law aims to protect owners of
commercially valuable information against unfair competition by parties who obtained
that information through a breach of confidence or through improper means, provided that
the information qualifies as a trade secret. The parties in National Rejectors (plaintiff and
defendant) must make the strongest possible argument that they should win a claim of trade
secrets misappropriation. CATO’s argumentation model provides an account of how past
cases can be used to support such arguments.
3.1. Background: Use of factors to represent cases
Before describing the Factor Hierarchy, we discuss how cases are represented. In CATO,
cases are represented in terms of factors [7,8]. Factors are stereotypical collections of facts
2 HYPO, which was an argumentation program rather than an instructional program, had a number of
capabilities that were not adopted in CATO. For example, the “Dimensions” used to represent cases in HYPO
capture more information than CATO’s factors [8,53,56]. Also, HYPO was able to identify “hypothetical
modifications” of a problem situation that led to a shift in the balance of an argument. The fact that these
capabilities were not included in the CATO program does not reflect a judgment about their potential utility
for computer-based instruction.
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Facts FactorsNational Rejectors, Inc., v. Trieman
Since the 1940s, National was practically the sole supplier of rejectors
and changers, coin-handling devices used in vending machines and
washers. National had developed its products through many years of
experimentation. In 1957, National employees, defendants Trieman and
Melvin, started their own business for producing coin-handling devices.
F15 Unique-Product (p)
Melvin, working at his home, designed two rejectors that were as
close as possible to the comparable National rejectors. He combined
his knowledge of the National device with information obtained from
measuring National rejectors. He also used production drawings, a
few parts, and materials obtained, without consent, from National.
However, none of defendants’ drawings was shown to be a copy of a
drawing of National’s. The resulting rejector improved on the National
product in certain ways.
F18 Identical-Products (p)
F7 Brought-Tools (p)
Melvin and Trieman resigned from National in March and July,
1959, respectively. Twelve other National employees went to work
for Coin Acceptors, after initiating contact themselves. One of them
used information remembered from National’s drawings. In a two-year
period, Coin Acceptors manufactured about 150,000 single-coin units.
National’s vice-president testified that a skilled mechanic could make
drawings by taking apart the National rejectors and measuring the
parts. Information about the parts was publicized in National’s patents
as well as in catalogs, brochures, and manuals distributed to customers
and to the trade generally. National did not take any steps at its plant to
keep its information confidential. Employees were not required to sign
non-competition agreements or notified of confidentiality. Engineering
drawings were sent to customers and prospective bidders without





Fig. 2. Textual description of case facts and the applicable factors.
that, experts agree, influence the outcome of a case. Although generally a factor is neither
necessary nor sufficient to decide a legal claim, all else being equal the presence of a
factor makes a case stronger or weaker for the plaintiff. CATO has a set of 26 factors
for the domain of trade secrets law, 12 of which were first used in HYPO. Some of
these factors were gleaned from the list of factors presented in the Restatement of Torts
§757, comment b, which until recently many courts have adopted as an authoritative
statement of the law of trade secrets. Other factors were extracted from cases and secondary
sources.
For example, in the National Rejectors problem shown in Fig. 2, the plaintiff’s position
is strengthened by the fact that its product was unique on the market (factor F15, Unique-
Product). Also, one of the defendants took product development information and tools
from the plaintiff’s business (F7, Brought-Tools) and the defendant manufactured a product
that was highly similar to the plaintiff’s (F18, Identical-Product). On the other hand, in
the defendant’s favor, the plaintiff did not take any measures to protect the secrecy of
its information (F19, No-Security-Measures) and disclosed information to outsiders (F10,
Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders) and even to the trade and general public (F27, Disclosure-
In-Public-Forum). Also, the information that the plaintiff claimed to be its trade secret
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could be learned by taking apart and examining the plaintiff’s devices (F16, Info-Reverse-
Engineerable).3
Given that some of the factors that apply in the National Rejectors problem favor the
plaintiff, while others favor the defendant, who should win? In law, there is no authoritative
weighting scheme that can be used to decide whether the pro-plaintiff factors outweigh the
pro-defendant factors, or vice versa [8]. Instead, arguers make arguments based on past
cases, which they typically organize by the issues that are raised by the given problem
situation. The construction of such arguments involves the use of background knowledge
about the meaning of the factors used to represent cases.
3.2. The Factor Hierarchy
One of CATO’s innovative features is its representation of middle-level normative
knowledge, called the Factor Hierarchy, part of which is shown in Fig. 3. The Factor
Hierarchy is not a rendition of an existing authoritative or established conceptual
hierarchy for the domain of trade secrets law, but was constructed following a knowledge
engineering approach. The Factor Hierarchy covers the basic requirements of a claim for
trade secret misappropriation.4 The Factor Hierarchy is not meant to state necessary or
sufficient conditions for winning a claim of trade secrets misappropriation. The knowledge
represented in the Factor Hierarchy is weaker than that. In this sense, CATO’s Factor
Hierarchy is different from Branting’s proposed reduction graphs for representing the ratio
decidendi of cases [20], which are intended to represent legal knowledge at multiple levels
of abstraction, just as is done in the Factor Hierarchy.
In the Factor Hierarchy, the 26 factors used to represent cases, some of which are
shown at the bottom in Fig. 3, are linked to normative concepts: 11 so-called Intermediate
Legal Concerns in the middle tiers, which in turn are linked to 5 Legal Issues at the top
of the Factor Hierarchy. We use the terms “abstract factors” or “high-level factors” to
refer to the Intermediate Legal Concerns and Legal Issues. Each high-level factor stands
for two opposing conclusions, one favoring the plaintiff, one favoring the defendant. For
example, associated with abstract factor F102, Efforts-To-Maintain-Secrecy, are a pro-
plaintiff conclusion that “Plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information”
3 In order to add a case to CATO’s Case Database, or to input a new problem situation, it must first be
represented in terms of factors. To ascertain which factors apply, the case entry person must read the opinion, the
document in which the court summarizes the facts of the case and explains its decision. Occasionally, this process
leads to the discovery of new factors. If the case is to be used in CATO’s instructional environment, the case entry
person must also create a “squib”, a one page summary of the court’s opinion. Adding a new case typically takes
several hours. It has been our experience that even with experienced case entry people there remains an element
of subjectivity in deciding which factors apply in a given case.
4 To give a more specific idea of how much ground the Factor Hierarchy covers: In an American law school,
the material in the Factor Hierarchy represents about one fifth of a three credit course on intellectual property
law, an increasingly popular elective course in a normal three-year, eighty-eight credit course of study. We stress,
however, that CATO’s instructional environment was designed to teach argumentation skills to beginning law
students, not trade secret law. Its argumentation model is not specific to trade secrets law, even if its Factor
Hierarchy and case database are.
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and a pro-defendant conclusion that “Plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining the
secrecy of its information”.
A positive link in the hierarchy indicates that a factor lends (defeasible) support to a
more abstract factor, in other words, that it tends to favor a conclusion for a particular
side with respect to a normative concept. A negative link indicates that a factor tends
to favor an opposite conclusion. In Fig. 3, for example, all of the factors and abstract
factors linked to F102, Efforts-To-Maintain-Secrecy, provide evidence for or against the
conclusions associated with F102, which itself provides evidence concerning the more
abstract issue of whether the information is a trade secret, F101, Info-Trade-Secret.
Links can be strong (thick links) or weak (thin links), indicating the level of support
that they represent. CATO takes into account the link strength in order to evaluate the
support for abstract factors, as is discussed further below. The links are assumed to
be self-evident, grounded in the common sense of the legal claim. Roth [57] recently
proposed ways of modeling arguments about links in Factor Hierarchies such as CATO’s,
which have the potential to lead to interesting extensions of CATO’s current argument
moves.
The Legal Issues at the top of the Factor Hierarchy correspond to the main issues
that courts often address in explaining their decisions. Some of the Legal Issues are
gleaned from the Restatement 1st of Torts, §757, which provides that one is liable for
misappropriating another’s trade secret if one uses that secret in breach of a confidential
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relationship or uses improper means to acquire the secret. The corresponding Legal Issues
are F114, Confidential-Relationship and F110, Improper-Means-Conclusion. Other issues
come from cases or secondary literature. Intermediate Legal Concerns correspond to
concepts used by legal experts to analyze cases and explain decisions in cases, but they
are subordinate to the Legal Issues. The Intermediate Legal concerns related to the issue
F101, Info-Trade-Secret correspond to factors listed in the Restatement 1st if Torts, §757.
Others come primarily from cases.
Although we illustrate CATO’s argumentation model in the domain of trade secrets
law, the model itself is not specific to that area of the law. Factor representations of cases
have been developed for tax law in the CABARET system [54] and bankruptcy law in
BANKXX [55]. Also, we have developed a CATO case database with cases about the
employee/independent distinction and have identified factors for the fair use concept in
copyright law. No Factor Hierarchies were developed for any of these areas. Rissland
[52] has shown that some of the arguments made before the United States Supreme Court
involve hypothetically modifying cases by moving them along “Dimensions”, of which
CATO’s factors are slightly simplified versions.
Based on our experience in the area of trade secrets law, we estimate that it would take
2–4 months to develop an initial case database and Factor Hierarchy for a new area of the
law, depending on the knowledge engineering experience of the developers, their degree
of legal expertise, and the level of involvement of legal experts. Ideally, one would interact
regularly with legal experts, asking them to make arguments with carefully selected sets of
cases, including arguments about the significance of similarities and differences. Citation
services such as those offered by the Westlaw™ legal information retrieval system, which
lists for any given case the cases that have distinguished it, are likely to be very helpful in
selecting small groups of cases that make interesting comparisons.
4. Using background knowledge to organize multi-case arguments by issues
Having described a representation of background knowledge, we now present a model
that details how the background knowledge can be used for purposes of argumentation.
A second innovation of the CATO model is a computational method for generating multi-
case arguments organized by issues. In this section, we describe this method, highlighting
how CATO uses the background knowledge represented in its Factor Hierarchy to identify
issues in a problem and to marshal cases.
4.1. Identifying issues
The first step in generating Issue-Based Arguments is to identify the main issues that
a problem raises. The CATO model focuses on issues of how the law should be applied
to the facts of a case, related to some of the important concepts in trade secrets law, such
as those found in the Restatement 1st of Torts. Which issues are raised in a particular
problem depends on which factors are present. CATO raises an issue when a problem
or case presents evidence related to it in the form of base-level factors, regardless of
which side these factors favor. That is, to identify issues in a problem or case, CATO
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collects all Legal Issues in the Factor Hierarchy that are linked to the case’s applicable
factors.
Following this method, CATO identifies three issues raised by the National Rejectors
factors, shown in Fig. 4. There are conflicting factors with respect to the issue of whether
the plaintiff’s information is a trade secret (F101). For example, the plaintiff can cite
the fact that its product was unique in the market (pro-plaintiff factor F15) as evidence
that its information should be considered a trade secret. The defendant, on the other
hand, could point to the disclosures that the plaintiff made to outsiders (F10) and the
general public (F27) as evidence that supports the opposite conclusion. It appears that
the plaintiff’s position is rather weak with respect to this issue, since many of the related
factors favor the defendant, but one cannot really know without looking at past cases.
There are no conflicting factors related to the other two issues. The plaintiff’s position
with respect to these issues appears to be much stronger than for the first issue, but there is
still the question whether the pro-plaintiff factors provide sufficient evidence to warrant a
conclusion favorable to the plaintiff with respect to those issues.
Thus, like other programs, CATO raises an issue when there is uncertainty about
a conclusion. Gardner’s system for the domain of contract law raised issues when it
detected that it had either had insufficient knowledge or conflicting knowledge related to
a question [35]. CHASER, a system for tort law, raises issues when it finds arguments for
both sides related to an element of a tort claim [30]. CATO is perhaps less selective or
specific when raising issues than these programs, but it is unique in that it uses the same
representation of background knowledge to organize arguments by issues and to reason
about the significance of differences of cases.
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4.2. Organizing arguments by issuesHaving identified issues, the next step is to generate an argument that addresses each
issue, as illustrated in Fig. 5, which shows an Issue-Based Argument generated by CATO
on behalf of the defendant in National Rejectors. During the instruction with CATO, these
arguments serve as models for the (written) arguments that students are asked to make, as
discussed in a later section of the paper.
CATO’s argument about each issue follows a basic rhetorical design, shown in the
annotations on the right in Fig. 5. CATO first emphasizes the strengths related to the
issue and then counteracts any weaknesses that may be present, using cases to support
its points. Further, when arguing on behalf of the defendant, CATO responds to points
made by the plaintiff in its argument (not shown). CATO uses four basic argument moves
to employ cases within its basic rhetorical strategy. When making an affirmative argument,
it cites cases to emphasize strengths and downplay weaknesses related to an issue. When
responding to an argument made by the opponent, it distinguishes cases and cites cases
as counterexamples. The latter two argument moves were first used in the HYPO program
[7,8]. In constructing arguments focused on issues, CATO uses the background knowledge
represented in its Factor Hierarchy extensively, namely,
• to identify issues in a problem;
• in the discussion of an issue, to focus on the factual strengths and weaknesses (factors)
that are related to the issue and to cite cases to emphasize strengths and downplay
weaknesses;
• to give reasons why particular factual strengths matter to an issue being discussed;
• to find strengths that are closely related to weaknesses and therefore compensate for
those weaknesses.
For example, in its argument about the issue of whether the plaintiff’s information is a
trade secret, represented in the Factor Hierarchy by Legal Issue F101, Info-Trade-Secret,
CATO cites the defendant’s strengths related to this issue, namely, the fact that the plaintiff
disclosed its purported trade secret in various ways (factors F10 and F27) without taking
any measures to keep the information secret (F19) and the fact that the information could
be learned by reverse-engineering the plaintiff’s product (F16). The strengths correspond
to the pro-defendant factors present in National Rejectors that are linked to the Legal Issue
F101 in the Factor Hierarchy (see Fig. 3). References to factors and abstract factors are
shown in Fig. 5 in square brackets. To emphasize these strengths, CATO characterizes
their meaning in more abstract terms: “plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining . . .
secrecy” and “plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or available from sources
outside plaintiff’s business”. These phrases correspond to Intermediate Legal Concerns
selected from the Factor Hierarchy. Specifically, CATO selects the Intermediate Legal
Concerns that connect the factors and issue of interest, F101 Info-Trade-Secret, namely,
F102, Efforts-To-Maintain-Secrecy, and F105 Info-Known-Or-Available (see Fig. 3). In
order to further emphasize the defendant’s strengths, CATO cites two cases in which
similar sets of strengths were present and the defendant won: Yokana and Dynamics. Here,
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To justify a favorable decision
on an issue:
Defendant should win a claim of trade secrets misappropriation. Plaintiff’s
information is not a trade secret [F101], defendant did not acquire plaintiff’s
information through improper means [F110], and defendant’s information was the
result of independent development efforts and investment [F112].
Plaintiff’s information is not a trade secret [F101]
Point to strengths, related to issue,
say why they matter
Show cases in which these strengths
led to a favorable outcome
Plaintiff’s information is not a trade secret [F101]. Restatement 1st of Torts s
757, and Comment b, factors 1–6 (1939). In the problem at hand, plaintiff made
disclosures to others outside its business [F10], plaintiff’s product information
could be learned by reverse-engineering [F16], plaintiff did not adopt any security
measures [F19], and plaintiff presented or published the information in a public
forum [F27]. This shows that plaintiff showed a lack of interest in maintaining
the secrecy of its information [F102] and plaintiff’s information was known in the
industry or available from sources outside plaintiff’s business [F105]. In Midland-
Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411 (3rd Cir.1961) and Dynamics Research Corp.
v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, there was similar evidence that
plaintiff’s information is not a trade secret [F101], and defendant won. Yokana
held for defendant, where, as in the case at hand, plaintiff made disclosures to
others outside its business [F10], plaintiff’s product information could be learned
by reverse-engineering [F16], and plaintiff made disclosures of the information in a
public forum [F27]. In Dynamics, as in the current case, plaintiff made disclosures
of the information in a public forum [F27], and defendant won.
Discuss weakness(es) related to
issue. Point to strengths that
compensate.
Show cases that had favorable
outcome in spite of weakness(es)
The fact that plaintiff was the only manufacturer making the product [F15]
does not necessarily imply a conclusion that plaintiff’s information is a trade
secret [F101], especially where plaintiff’s information could be ascertained
by examining or reverse engineering plaintiff’s product [F16], plaintiff made
disclosures to others outside its business [F10], and plaintiff presented or published
the information in a public forum [F27]. In Dynamics, defendant won even though
plaintiff was the only manufacturer making the product [F15]. In Dynamics.
plaintiff presented or published the information in a public forum [F27].
The cases cited by plaintiff with respect to this issue, Emery, Schreyer, and Allen,
can be distinguished. Moreover, they are not necessarily the most relevant cases.
Defendant can cite a counterexample to some of these cases.
Distinguish cases cited by the
opponent and cite counter-
examples
Schreyer is distinguishable. It is stronger for plaintiff than is the current problem.
In Schreyer, defendant saved time or money by using plaintiff’s information. This
was not so in National Rejectors. Also, in National Rejectors, plaintiff disclosed its
product information to outsiders and plaintiff did not take any measures to protect
the information. This was not so in Schreyer. Additionally, Yokana is more on
point than Schreyer, yet held for defendant. In Yokana, as in the current problem,
plaintiff’s former employee took documents, blueprints, or tools to defendant [F7]
and plaintiff made disclosures to others outside its business [F10]. This was not so
in Schreyer. It follows that Yokana is more similar to the problem.
[argument distinguishing Emery and Allen]
Defendant did not acquire plaintiff’s information through improper means
[F110]
[argument justifying a decision for defendant on this issue and response to cases
cited by plaintiff ]
Defendant’s information was the result of independent development efforts
and investment [F112]
Fig. 5. Issue-Based Argument generated by CATO (annotations added).
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CATO employs one of its basic argument moves, Citing a favorable case to emphasize
strengths.
CATO also employs its Factor Hierarchy as it addresses the defendant’s sole weakness
related to the given issue, the fact that the plaintiff’s product was unique in the market
(factor F15 Unique-Product). To downplay this weakness, CATO first points to a number of
pro-defendant factors present in the National Rejectors problem that compensate for it: The
plaintiff had made disclosures of the information (F10, F27) and the information could be
learned by reverse-engineering the plaintiff’s product (F16). To select these compensating
factors, CATO looks for favorable (that is, pro-defendant) factors that are closely related
to the given weakness, meaning that they are linked to an Intermediate Legal Concern that
is linked to the given weakness and to the issue of interest. Abstract factor F105 Info-
Known-Or-Available qualifies (see Fig. 3). A second way in which CATO downplays the
defendant’s weakness, F15, is by pointing to a case, Dynamics, in which the defendant won
in spite of the presence of that same weakness. The point based on Dynamics illustrates
CATO’s basic argument move Citing a favorable case to argue that weaknesses are not
fatal.
Arguing on behalf of the defendant, CATO also responds to the argument that the
plaintiff presumably made. To the extent possible, it distinguishes the cases cited by the
plaintiff and cites counterexamples, using the basic argument moves Distinguishing a case
with an unfavorable outcome and Citing a more on point counterexample to a case cited
by an opponent. CATO follows the same basic rhetorical approach for the other two issues
identified in the problem.
4.3. An algorithm for generating multi-case arguments organized by issues
In order to generate an Issue-Based Argument, CATO must be given a problem situation
and a set of precedent cases, all represented in terms factors, and a side on whose
behalf to argue (plaintiff or defendant). The set of past cases may include cases won
by both sides. If it includes unfavorable cases, CATO will not only make an affirmative
argument that the given side should win, citing favorable cases, but will also respond to
the points that the opponent could make based on the given unfavorable cases. CATO
generates Issue-Based Arguments (written in English) in three steps, shown in Fig. 6: First,
using the Factor Hierarchy, it identifies applicable issues and determines which problem
strengths and weaknesses are related to each issue. Second, CATO determines for each
issue which favorable cases can be used to emphasize strengths or downplay weaknesses
related to the issue. It also determines for each case how the opponent could respond,
either by distinguishing it or by citing one or more of the given unfavorable cases as
counterexamples. If the given set of precedent cases includes unfavorable cases, CATO
repeats the same step, this time using the unfavorable cases. This way, CATO determines
what points the opponent could make, so that it knows how to respond. Third, using the
information collected and organized in the previous two steps, CATO generates the text
of the argument, selecting argument templates and filling them out with English phrases
stored with each case, factor, or abstract factor.
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Generate Issue-Based Argument
Input: a problem situation and a set of past cases represented in terms of factors, and a side on whose behalf
to argue (plaintiff or defendant).
Knowledge source: Factor Hierarchy
Output: Multi-case argument organized by issues, written in English
Procedure:
Identify issues
Find all issues related to the problem factors.
For each issue I
Determine strengths and weaknesses in the problem related to I .
For the strengths, find reasons why they matter (Intermediate Legal Concerns in the Factor Hierarchy).
Organize cases by issues
For each issue I
Determine which of the given cases are relevant to I (i.e., have factors linked to I in the Factor
Hierarchy). For each relevant favorable case, determine which of its strengths and weaknesses are
related to I .
For each weakness related to I , check if there are compensating strengths in the problem (i.e., favorable
factors that share with the weakness an Intermediate Legal Concern as ancestor). Also, check which
of the given cases are can be used to downplay the weakness (i.e., cases with favorable outcome even
though they have the weakness).
Check for which of the relevant (favorable) cases there are counterexamples among the given cases
(i.e., cases that are more on point or as on point).
Do the same for the opposing side. (When generating an Issue-Based Argument on behalf of the defendant,
it is necessary to reconstruct how cases were used in the argument being responded to.)
Generate English text for argument organized by issues
For each issue I
Draw attention to strengths related to I , pointing to reasons why they matter and citing relevant cases.
Deal with weaknesses related to I , pointing to compensating strengths and citing counterexamples.
When arguing on behalf of the defendant, distinguish cases cited by plaintiff when discussing I and
cite counterexamples.
Fig. 6. CATO’s method for generating Issue-Based Arguments.
5. Using background knowledge to reason about the significance of differences
A third innovative feature of the CATO model are its methods for using background
to reason about the significance of differences among cases. In legal argumentation, the
parties very frequently offer competing analogies to the problem. Much legal argument
therefore involves debating whether a case is really the same as the problem or not. One
side analogizes the problem to a case, the other side distinguishes the problem. The first
side downplays the significance of the differences, the opponent emphasizes them. The
dialectical process is one of characterizing and re-characterizing the relevant features of
the problem and the cited case in terms of their legal significance in support of an argument
either that the cases should be decided alike or differently. Through this dialectic process it
usually becomes clear which of the competing analogies is more relevant. While the HYPO
program already provided an account of analogizing and distinguishing cases in terms of
factors [7,8], CATO is the first computational model of legal argument that focuses on
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National Rejectors (d) Ferranti (d)
* F7 Brought-Tools (p) F2 Bribe-Employee (p)
F10 Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders (d) * F17 Info-Independently-Generated (d)
* F15 Unique-Product (p) = F19 No-Security-Measures (d)
F16 Info-Reverse-Engineerable (d) * F20 Info-Known-To-Competitors (d)
* F18 Identical-Products (p) = F27 Disclosure-In-Public-Forum (d)
= F19 No-Security-Measures (d)
= F27 Disclosure-In-Public-Forum (d) = shared factor * distinction
⇒ Defendant’s argument analogizing the National Rejectors problem to the Ferranti case
Where plaintiff did not adopt any security measures [F19] and plaintiff made disclosures of the information
in a public forum [F27], defendant should win a claim of trade secrets misappropriation, as in Ferranti
Electric, Inc. v. Harwood, 43 Misc.2d 533, 251 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1964).
⇐ Plaintiff’s argument distinguishing the National Rejectors problem from the Ferranti case
Ferranti is distinguishable. It is stronger for defendant than is the current problem. In Ferranti, defendant
developed its product independently of plaintiff’s [F17] and plaintiff’s information was generally known in
the industry [F20]. This was not so in National Rejectors.
Also, in National Rejectors, plaintiff’s former employee removed documents containing plaintiff’s
information [F7], plaintiff’s product was different from products made by competitors [F15], and there were
substantial similarities between plaintiff’s and defendant’s products [F18]. This was not so in Ferranti.
Fig. 7. CATO’s arguments analogizing and distinguishing a problem and a precedent.
arguments about similarity, in which arguers characterize and re-characterize cases in light
of abstract background knowledge.
5.1. Background: Comparing and contrasting cases in terms of factors
Before we turn to CATO’s arguments about the significance of distinctions, we first
describe how CATO, following the approach pioneered in HYPO [7,8], models arguments
analogizing and distinguishing a problem and a past case. Fig. 7 shows a comparison of the
factors of the National Rejectors problem and Ferranti, a case won by the defendant. The
two cases have several factors in common, marked with “=” in Fig. 7. CATO, arguing on
behalf of the defendant, draws an analogy between the cases, pointing to the shared factors
as relevant similarities and claiming that they justify treating the cases alike: Ferranti was
won by the defendant, so should National Rejectors. The referenced factors are shown in
square brackets.
While the defendant’s argument is quite convincing, the analogy is not perfect.
There are distinctions between the cases, marked with “*” in Fig. 7. CATO arguing
on behalf of the plaintiff argues that Ferranti is distinguishable and hence is not a
relevant precedent, thereby undermining the defendant’s argument. CATO’s argument
is shown in Fig. 7. The gist of the argument is that the distinguishing factors are
evidence that Ferranti is stronger for the defendant than is National Rejectors. The extra
strengths for the defendant in Ferranti and the extra strengths for the plaintiff in National
Rejectors justify deciding the two cases differently. It is important to note that not all
differences are distinctions: CATO’s argument distinguishing the two cases focuses on
those unshared factors that help in showing that Ferranti is stronger for the defendant
200 V. Aleven / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 183–237
than is National Rejectors. Generally, unshared factors are distinctions when they help in
showing that the cited case is stronger, for the side that cited it, than the given problem
situation. This way of modeling distinguishing was introduced in the HYPO program
[7,8].
5.2. Example arguments about the significance of distinctions
Given that Ferranti is not a perfect match with National Rejectors, how important are
the similarities and differences? To assess the significance of similarities and differences
of cases, in arguer must relate them to more general (but still domain-specific) normative
concepts. In this section we illustrate how CATO models the strategic characterization
and re-characterization of cases of which skilled attorneys are capable in order to argue
that cases are similar or not. We also illustrate how these arguments satisfy an important
desideratum for similarity assessment in CBR, namely, that the significance of distinctions
depends on the context in which the argument is made [12,13,40]. In general, schemes for
similarity assessment in all but the simplest domains must assign weights to similarities
and differences in a context-sensitive manner. The significance of differences must depend
on the specifics of the problem and past case being compared and the purpose for which
the comparison is made.
To emphasize the significance of a distinction, CATO characterizes the cases as
different in the abstract and thus argues that the distinction is indicative of a deeper
difference between the cases. Conversely, CATO downplays the significance of a
distinction by showing that at a more abstract level, a parallel exists between the cases,
arguing in effect that the apparent distinction is merely a mismatch of details. Also,
CATO can downplay a distinction by showing an interpretation of the case in which
the distinction applies that is opposite to what the presence of the distinction would
suggest.
Applying these methods, arguers with opposing viewpoints may offer alternative
characterizations of a distinction’s significance, as is illustrated in Fig. 8, which shows
arguments generated by CATO about the significance of one of the distinctions between
National Rejectors and Ferranti, the fact that in Ferranti, but not in National Rejectors,
the information claimed to be a trade secret was known in the industry (F20). CATO
downplays the distinction on behalf of the defendant, interpreting the F20 factor in Ferranti
as evidence that the plaintiff’s information was known outside the plaintiff’s business
(F105). It points to evidence that warrants the same interpretation of National Rejectors:
In National Rejectors, the plaintiff had disclosed the information to outsiders (factor F10)
and even in a public forum (F27). Further, the information could be learned by reverse-
engineering plaintiff’s product (F16). Thus, the defendant argues, in spite of the apparent
distinction, at a deeper level, the cases are similar. The argument illustrates CATO’s
argument move drawing an abstract parallel.
CATO arguing on behalf of the plaintiff is not without retort. It draws attention to an
alternative interpretation of the distinction’s meaning, one that is equally plausible as the
one offered in the argument on behalf of the defendant, and shows that with respect to
that interpretation, a contrast exists between the cases. In its argument on behalf of the
plaintiff, CATO characterizes the F20 distinction as showing that in Ferranti, the defendant
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National Rejectors (d) Ferranti (d)
* F7 Brought-Tools (p) F2 Bribe-Employee (p)
F10 Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders (d) * F17 Info-Independently-Generated (d)
* F15 Unique-Product (p) = F19 No-Security-Measures (d)
F16 Info-Reverse-Engineerable (d) * F20 Info-Known-To-Competitors (d)
* F18 Identical-Products (p) = F27 Disclosure-In-Public-Forum (d)
= F19 No-Security-Measures (d)
= F27 Disclosure-In-Public-Forum (d) = shared factor * distinction
⇒ Defendant’s argument downplaying distinction F20 in Ferranti.
In Ferranti, plaintiff’s information was known to competitors [F20]. This was not so in National Rejectors.
However, this is not a significant distinction. In National Rejectors, plaintiff disclosed its information to
parties outside its business [F10], plaintiff’s information could be ascertained by examining or reverse
engineering plaintiff’s product [F16], and plaintiff made disclosures of the information in a public forum
[F27]. Therefore, in both cases, plaintiff’s information was known in the industry or available from sources
outside plaintiff’s business [F105].
⇐ Plaintiff’s argument emphasizing distinction F20 in Ferranti.
In Ferranti, plaintiff’s information was known to competitors [F20]. This was not so in National Rejectors.
This is a marked distinction. It shows that in Ferranti, defendant obtained or could have obtained its
information by legitimate means [F120]. Other facts in Ferranti further support this: Defendant produced its
information through its own independent efforts [F17]. In National Rejectors, by contrast, defendant may
have acquired plaintiff’s information through improper means [F120]: Plaintiff’s former employee removed
documents containing plaintiff’s information [F7].
Fig. 8. CATO’s arguments interpreting the significance of a distinction.
did not use (or did not need to use) improper means to obtain the plaintiff’s information.
That interpretation of Ferranti is supported also by the fact that in Ferranti the defendant
developed its product independently, without using the plaintiff’s information (factor F17
Info-Independently-Generated). In National Rejectors, by contrast, there was evidence that
the defendants used improper means to obtain the plaintiff’s information, namely, the fact
that they brought product development information when they left plaintiff’s employ (F7).
Thus, CATO emphasizes the distinctions using its argument move: Drawing an abstract
contrast.
Each argument is based on a different interpretation of the two cases. Both interpreta-
tions are plausible and relate to important concerns in trade secret law. Both were chosen
in a strategic manner, to advance a goal to argue that cases are similar or not. The argument
exchange illustrated here does not definitively resolve the question whether the given dis-
tinction matters much and whether the cases are sufficiently similar. Nonetheless, modeling
context-sensitive arguments about the significance of differences among cases is a contri-
bution to the fields of AI and Law and CBR. The given argument exchange illustrates one
way in which CATO’s arguments about the significance of distinctions are sensitive to the
arguer’s viewpoint. CATO is able to focus on different abstract interpretations of the cases
being compared, depending on whether it attempts to play up or play down a distinction be-
tween them. Further aspects of the context-sensitivity of CATO’s arguments are illustrated
elsewhere [3,9].
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Support for an abstract factor
Pro-S conclusion P (S) associated with abstract factor P is supported, with respect to a reference
set of base-level factors REF (typically the applicable factors in a given case or problem) iff for
some pro-S factor F ∈ REF, there is a path in the Factor Hierarchy
F →X1 →X2 →·· · →Xn→ P, n 0
such that for each Xi , as well as for P , the path to it from F is strong (i.e., is made up of strong
links only), or there is no strong path to it from any opposing (i.e., con-S) factor ∈ REF.
Fig. 9. Criterion for evaluating whether a conclusion associated with an abstract factor is supported.
5.3. Downplaying a distinction by drawing an abstract parallel between cases
In this section, we describe CATO’s method for drawing an abstract parallel between
two cases, the main way in which it can downplay the significance of a distinction. The
key to this method is a heuristic criterion for selecting the focal abstractions used in these
arguments, that is, the abstract interpretations of cases that are highlighted. In the process of
selecting focal abstractions, CATO evaluates the support that exists for and against abstract
factors in the Factor Hierarchy, using a simple way of propagating evidence along the links
in the hierarchy, taking into account whether links are weak or strong. We describe this
method first. In order for a conclusion associated with an abstract factor to be supported, it
is not necessary that it can be proven in one sense or another. Rather, there must be evidence
in favor of the conclusion. Weak evidence in favor of a conclusion can be blocked by strong
opposing evidence. Strong evidence in favor of a conclusion however cannot be blocked.
When the evidence for the two opposing conclusions associated with a given abstract factor
is of equal strength, we consider both conclusions to be supported. For examples, see [1,
p. 65]. A formal description of CATO’s notion of support is given in Fig. 9. However, the
details of how CATO evaluates support for abstract factors are unimportant. Any scheme
for non-monotonic reasoning that has the properties outlined here could be used.
Now let us look in more detail at CATO’s method for drawing an abstract parallel
between two cases, shown in Fig. 10. Let us assume that factor D is a distinction between
two given cases. CATO downplays distinction D if it can find an abstract factor P , that (a)
is an ancestor in the Factor Hierarchy of D, and (b) is supported in the other case, that is,
the case in which D does not apply, by one or more factors that favor the same side as D.
(These factors we call similar factors in the other case.) Abstract factor P is used as the
focal abstraction in an argument drawing an abstract parallel, provided that it is eligible to
be used as a focal abstraction, meaning that it must be an Intermediate Legal Concern or a
Legal Issue not linked to any Intermediate Legal Concern. This requirement was added to
avoid drawing a parallel that is so broad to be unconvincing or conclusory.
To see how this criterion applies to the distinction F20 between National Rejectors
and Ferranti discussed earlier, we must compare the support in each case for the abstract
factors that are linked to the distinction of interest, factor F20, depicted in Fig. 11.
The relevant base-level factors and abstract factors that apply in National Rejectors
are shown on the left, those in Ferranti, on the right. The factors that support each
relevant abstract factor, calculated according to the criterion described previously, are
shown in a rounded rectangle next to the abstract factor. For example, in National
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Drawing an abstract parallel
An abstract factor P can be used to downplay distinction D of case Cdist, as compared to
case Cother, where D favors side S, by drawing an abstract parallel, if
• P is eligible for use as a focal abstraction, and
• P is an ancestor in the Factor Hierarchy of D, and
• P (S) is supported in Cother.
Similar factors in the other case
The pro-S factors in Cother that are descendants of P are used as similar factors in the
other case.
Eligible as focal abstraction
An abstract factor is eligible for use as a focal abstraction if it is an Intermediate Legal
Concern or a Legal Issue not linked to any Intermediate Legal Concern.
Fig. 10. Criterion for selecting focal abstractions used to draw an abstract parallel.
Fig. 11. Comparing the support for abstract factors in National Rejectors and Ferranti in order to select the focal
abstractions for the arguments about the significance of distinction F20 in Ferranti.
Rejectors, the pro-defendant conclusion associated with abstract factor F106 is supported
by pro-defendant factors F10 and F27. The potential support from factor F15 to this
abstract factor (F106) however is blocked. The abstract factors that are eligible for
use as focal abstractions, according to the criterion described above, are shown as
gray boxes. Thus, we see that a parallel exists between the two cases with respect to
two abstract factors, F105 Info-Known-Or-Available and the more specific F106 Info-
Known. In National Rejectors, there is support for the pro-defendant conclusions related
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to both abstract factors, as shown in Fig. 11. Both could potentially serve as focal
abstractions.
When multiple abstract factors satisfy CATO’s criterion for selecting focal abstractions,
CATO selects those that are broad enough to maximize the set of base-level factors that can
be marshaled as evidence for a contrast or parallel between the cases, but are no broader
than that. By not selecting even broader abstractions, CATO avoids drawing a parallel or
contrast that is so broad that it is unconvincing or that might be more easily rebutted by the
opponent. In the current example, therefore, CATO prefers abstract factor F105 over the
more specific F106, since F105 provides the opportunity to marshal the additional factor
F16 as evidence of a parallel between the cases.
5.4. Emphasizing a distinction by drawing an abstract contrast between cases
In the current section, we describe how CATO emphasizes the significance of a
distinction by drawing an abstract contrast between two cases. Let us assume, as before,
that factor D is a distinction between two given cases. CATO uses abstract factor P (which
must be an ancestor in the Factor Hierarchy of distinction D) to draw an abstract contrast,
if a contrast exists between the given cases both with respect to P and with respect to
abstract factors “higher up” in the Factor Hierarchy, that is, with respect to ancestors of
P (see Fig. 12). The requirement that there is a contrast higher up ensures that CATO
avoids drawing an abstract contrast to which an opponent could respond by drawing an
even broader parallel, which would an effective rebuttal. In order for a contrast to exist
with respect to P,P must be supported in the case in which the distinction D applies by
the distinction D itself and perhaps by other factors. In the other case, P must either be
supported by factors that favor the opposing side, compared to D. Alternatively, it must be
reasonable to argue that in the other case P is not supported by factors that favor the same
side as D. For the latter condition to be met, a closed-world assumption must be warranted
with respect to the given conclusion associated with P . This constraint helps avoid certain
unwarranted inferences based on the absence of information. For example, even when there
are no factors that indicate that the information that the plaintiff claims as its trade secret is
valuable for the plaintiff’s business (abstract factor F104, Info-Valuable), it makes no sense
to claim the information would not be valuable. The parties would not be in court if the
information had no value. By indicating that a closed-world assumption is not warranted
with respect to the pro-plaintiff conclusion associated with F104, that inference can be
avoided. At other times, a closed-world assumption is warranted. For example, when there
is no information that indicates that the plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of
the information at issue (abstract factor F102 Efforts-To-Maintain-Secrecy), arguing that
none were taken is reasonable. Therefore, CATO needs to be told (by the developer of the
Factor Hierarchy) for which conclusions associated with abstract factors a closed-world
assumption can be made.
When an abstract factor P satisfies these criteria, a contrast between the cases can be
elaborated with respect to P . In the one case, the distinction D and perhaps other factors
that favor the same side (we call these additional factors corroborating factors) provide
support for one of the conclusions associated with P . By contrast, in the other case,
there is no evidence for that conclusion or even evidence for the opposite conclusion.
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Drawing an abstract contrast
An abstract factor P can be used to emphasize a distinction D of case Cdist as compared to case Cother
where D favors side S, if
• P is eligible as focal abstraction, and
• P is supported by D in Cdist and
• either P (S) is not supported in Cother or P (opp(S)) is supported in Cother by factors that do not
apply in Cdist and
• there is a suitable contrast between Cdist and Cother at higher levels, that is, with respect to
ancestors of P in the Factor Hierarchy; specifically
– there must be a path from P to the top of the Factor Hierarchy all of whose abstract factors
(except possibly a Legal Issue at the top) are supported for S in Cdist, and
– there must not be a path from P to the top of the Factor Hierarchy containing any abstract
factors (except possibly a Legal Issue at the top) that are supported for S in Cother.
• if P (opp(S)) is not supported in Cother, then a closed-world assumption must be sanctioned with
respect to P (S).
Contrasting factors in the other case
All factors in Cother that support P (opp(S)) and do not apply also in Cdist are used as contrasting
factors in the other case.
Corroborating factors in the same case
All factors in Cdist that support P (S) (except D) and do not apply also in Cother are used as
corroborating factors in the same case.
Fig. 12. Criterion for selecting focal abstractions used to emphasize distinctions.
Factors supporting the opposite conclusion we call contrasting factors in the other
case.
Returning to the F20 distinction in the National Rejectors/Ferranti comparison, when
we compare the support for abstract factors in each of the two cases, we see that
abstract factor F120 Info-Legitimately-Obtained-Or-Obtainable satisfies CATO’s criterion
for drawing an abstract contrast (see Fig. 11). In Ferranti, F120 is supported by various pro-
defendant factors, including the distinction F20 and corroborating factor F17. In National
Rejectors, by contrast, F120 is supported by pro-plaintiff factor F7. CATO does not marshal
pro-defendant factor F27 in Ferranti as a corroborating factor, even though this factor also
supports F120. This factor is shared between the two cases and therefore not useful to draw
a contrast.
5.5. Downplaying a distinction by showing an opposite interpretation
We have seen how CATO downplays the significance of distinctions by drawing an
abstract parallel between two cases. A second way of arguing that a distinction is not
important is to show that the case in which the distinction occurs has additional factors
that support an interpretation of that case that is opposite to an interpretation suggested
by the presence of the distinction (showing an opposite interpretation). This argument
move is illustrated in Fig. 13, which shows CATO’s arguments about the significance of a
distinction in the comparison of National Rejectors and Televation, namely, the presence
in National Rejectors of factor F27, Disclosure-In-Public-Forum. Arguing on behalf of
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National Rejectors (d) Televation (p)
* F7 Brought-Tools (p) * F6 Security-Measures (p)
F10 Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders (d) = F10 Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders (d)
* F15 Unique-Product (p) * F12 Outsider-Disclosures-Restricted (p)
F16 Info-Reverse-Engineerable (d) = F15 Unique-Product (p)
* F18 Identical-Products (p) = F16 Info-Reverse-Engineerable (d)
= F19 No-Security-Measures (d) = F18 Identical-Products (p)
= F27 Disclosure-In-Public-Forum (d) ** F21 Knew-Info-Confidential (p)
⇒ Plaintiff’s argument downplaying distinction F27 in National Rejectors.
In National Rejectors, plaintiff disclosed its information in a public forum [F27]. This was not so in
Televation. However, this difference is insignificant. Even though in National Rejectors, plaintiff presented
or published the information in a public forum [F27], defendant may have acquired plaintiff’s information
through improper means [F120]: In National Rejectors, plaintiff’s former employee removed documents
containing plaintiff’s information [F7]. Even assuming (without conceding) that in National Rejectors,
defendant obtained or could have obtained its information by legitimate means [F120]: This was also true
in Televation, and yet plaintiff still won. In Televation, plaintiff’s product information could be learned by
reverse-engineering [F16], but plaintiff won nonetheless.
⇐ Defendant’s argument emphasizing distinction F27 in National Rejectors.
In National Rejectors, plaintiff disclosed its information in a public forum [F27]. This was not so in
Televation. This distinction is highly significant. It shows that in National Rejectors, plaintiff showed a
lack of interest in maintaining the secrecy of its information [F102]. Other facts in National Rejectors also
support this: Plaintiff did not take any measures to protect the information [F19]. By contrast, in Televation,
plaintiff took efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information [F102]: Plaintiff adopted security measures
[F6] and plaintiff imposed confidentiality restrictions in connection with its disclosures to outsiders [F12].
Fig. 13. CATO’s arguments downplaying and emphasizing a distinction in National Rejectors.
the plaintiff in National Rejectors, CATO argues that the distinction does not amount to
much, combining its two argument moves for downplaying a distinction. First, it shows an
interpretation of National Rejectors that is opposite to that suggested by the presence of the
distinguishing factor, F27. In National Rejectors, the fact that the plaintiff disclosed part
of its product information in a public forum (F27) should not be interpreted as showing
that the defendant obtained or could have obtained the plaintiff’s information legitimately
(F120p). That interpretation of National Rejectors is undercut by additional factors: In
National Rejectors, the defendant took the plaintiff’s product development documents or
tools that contained the information (F7), hardly a proper way of acquiring information.
CATO combines this argument move with its other move for downplaying the
significance of a distinction: it goes on to draw an abstract parallel between the cases.
In both cases, there was evidence that the plaintiff’s information was or could have been
obtained in a proper manner, without resorting to improper means (F120d). In National
Rejectors, the distinction F27 provides evidence for this interpretation, in Televation,
factor F16 Info-Reverse-Engineerable. To succeed rhetorically, the argument combining
these moves must take into account that they focus on opposing interpretations related to
the same abstract factor. It must present them as alternative interpretations of National
Rejectors that both lead to the same conclusion, namely, that the two cases are similar. The
gist of the argument is that whether one argues that in National Rejectors, the defendant
did or could have obtained the plaintiff’s information legitimately (F120d), or whether one
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argues that the defendant in National Rejectors used improper means (F120p), the cases are
not different with respect to F120. To generate this argument, CATO uses a text template
tailored to the situation where a single abstract factor is used simultaneously as the focal
abstraction in the two different moves for downplaying a distinction. The phrase “even
assuming (without conceding)” (see Fig. 13) signals that two alternative interpretations of
National Rejectors are being presented.
CATO’s argument template was designed also to address a second rhetorical concern.
In drawing an abstract parallel between the two cases on behalf of the plaintiff, CATO
is forced to focus on an interpretation of the problem that is favorable to the defendant,
namely, the fact that the defendant did or could have obtained the plaintiff’s information
legitimately (F120d). To succeed rhetorically, the argument must stress that the plaintiff
can still win, in spite of the plausibility of this (for the plaintiff) unfavorable interpretation.
Therefore, CATO’s text template for drawing an abstract parallel includes phrases like
“and yet plaintiff still won”. These phrases are added to the argument only when the
distinguishing factor applies in the problem situation. They are not needed when it applies
in the cited case, because in that situation, the abstract parallel involves a favorable
interpretation of the problem rather than an unfavorable one.
All in all, CATO’s argument shown in Fig. 13 makes effective use of Televation.
Not only does CATO downplay an apparent distinction between National Rejectors and
Televation, it argues also that a weakness in the plaintiff’s position, the presence of pro-
defendant factor F27, can be overcome and draws attention to a strength for plaintiff,
factor F7, Brought-Tools. In its response on behalf of the defendant in National Rejectors,
CATO elaborates a (rather striking) contrast between the cases based on a different
characterization of the F27 factor (see Fig. 13), illustrating again that CATO is adept at
selecting alternative characterizations of cases depending on whether its goal is to argue
that the cases are similar or different.
CATO’s heuristic criterion for selecting focal abstractions to show an opposite
interpretation is shown in Fig. 14. If factor D applies in a given case, then CATO uses
an abstract factor P to show an opposite interpretation of D if P is linked in the Factor
Hierarchy to D and is supported by applicable factors of that case that favor the opposing
side, as compared to D. We call these factors undercutting factors. If D applies in the
Showing an opposite interpretation
An abstract factor P can be used to downplay distinction D of case Cdist, as compared to
case Cother, where D favors side S, by showing an opposite interpretation, if
• P is eligible as focal abstraction, and
• P is an ancestor in the Factor Hierarchy of D, and
• P (opp(S)) is supported in Cdist; if Cdist is the cited case by factors that do not apply
also in Cother.
Undercutting factors in the same case
The con-S factors in Cdist that are descendants of P are used as undercutting factors in
the same case. If Cdist is the cited case, not the problem, then only factors are used that
are not shared between the cases, that is, that do not apply also in Cother.
Fig. 14. Criterion for selecting focal abstractions used to show an opposite interpretation.
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arguments about the significance of distinction F27 in National Rejectors.
cited case (as opposed to the problem situation), then the undercutting factors must not
apply also in the problem situation, to avoid drawing attention to unfavorable factors in the
problem.
To see why CATO selected F120 as the focal abstraction in its argument showing an
opposite interpretation of National Rejectors, we must consider the support for abstract
factors in National Rejectors, depicted on the left-hand side of Fig. 15. As before, the
support for abstract factors is shown in rounded rectangles. The pro-plaintiff conclusion
associated with abstract factor F120 satisfies CATO’s criterion for use as an opposite
interpretation. The distinction, pro-defendant factor F27, provides evidence for a pro-
defendant interpretation of National Rejectors with respect to F120. However, pro-plaintiff
factor F7, which favors the plaintiff, supports an opposite interpretation of National
Rejectors with respect to F120. Therefore, F7 is used as an undercutting factor. The fact
that the distinction F27 does not actually support the focal abstraction F120 (the potential
support is blocked) is incidental; CATO’s criterion neither requires nor prevents it.
Further, the pro-defendant conclusion associated with F120 satisfies CATO’ criterion
for being a focal abstraction in an argument drawing an abstract parallel. In National
Rejectors, the distinction, factor F27, provides some evidence for this interpretation, in
Televation, the interpretation is supported by pro-defendant factor F16. It may seem odd
that CATO uses F120 to elaborate an abstract parallel between two cases, even though
there is actually a contrast between the cases with respect to this abstract factor: As
shown in Fig. 15, in National Rejectors, the pro-plaintiff conclusion associated with this
abstract factor is supported, in Televation, on the other hand, the pro-defendant conclusion.
However, this contrast cannot be used to distinguish the two cases, as it does not help to
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show that Televation is stronger for the plaintiff than is National Rejectors. As mentioned,
differences are distinctions only if they make the cited case stronger for the side that cited
it than the problem.
6. Using background knowledge to select the most relevant cases
In addition to providing a computational account of important aspects of case-based
legal reasoning, CATO’s arguments about the significance of distinctions are the basis
for novel criteria for selecting the most relevant precedent cases, an important concern
in case-based legal argumentation and in CBR, generally. By and large, previous methods
for selecting the most relevant cases in systems for case-based legal reasoning did not take
into account the significance of distinctions. The HYPO program for example appraised
users of the distinctions that cases have, but did not reason about their significance and did
not take the distinctions into account when deciding what cases to present to the user as
the best cases to cite in a given problem situation [7,8,13]. It makes much sense, however,
to take into account the significance of differences when selecting the best cases, as we
illustrate below.
In the current section, we present CATO’s novel methods for assessing the relevance of
past cases, in the context of a given problem situation. We illustrate how CATO’s novel
methods, which rely on reasoning about the significance of differences, can help to assess
similarity in a more discriminating and accurate manner. In the next section, we present
results from an evaluation study in which these methods were compared, in terms of their
accuracy in predicting case outcomes, to an existing method used in interpretive CBR
programs and to standard inductive learning techniques.
6.1. Background: A criterion for selecting the most relevant cases without using
background knowledge
We first review a well-known relevance criterion that is often used when cases are
represented in terms of factors, namely, the criterion used by the HYPO program [7,
8]. This criterion does not involve the use of background knowledge nor does it involve
reasoning about the significance of distinctions. We then discuss how CATO’s techniques
for reasoning about the significance of distinctions can best be integrated with this method.
HYPO’s main criterion for selecting the most relevant cases was designed with the
following constraint in mind [8, Ch. 9]: An interpretive CBR program must select the
most relevant cases according to criteria that a human expert would recognize as plausible
and that provide an explanation or argument that the selected cases are more relevant
than those that were not selected. This constraint implies at minimum that the program’s
decisions should not rely on arbitrary factor weights or ways of calculating factor weights
that cannot be justified in an argument [13]. They should also not rely on simple counts
of the similarities and differences. HYPO’s criterion for selecting the most relevant cases,
called best untrumped cases or BUCs, observes this criterion. As illustrated below, CATO’s
relevance criteria also adhere to this constraint. The BUCs are cases that:
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• satisfy a minimum criterion for being citable in an argument, namely, that they share
with the problem at least one factor that favors the side that won the case, and
• of all available cases, have a maximum set of factors shared with the problem (these
cases are most on point, in that no other case won by the same side shares a more
inclusive set of factors with the problem), and
• are untrumped, meaning that there is no trumping counterexample, a case won by the
opponent that is more on point in that it shares a more inclusive set of factors with the
problem.
6.2. Two methods for applying background knowledge to select the most relevant cases
In this section, we discuss how CATO’s methods for reasoning about the significance of
differences can best be combined with (components of) the BUC criterion, which focuses
on the similarities that cases share with a given problem. This integration can be achieved
in different ways, depending on how much weight one gives to the absence of significant
distinctions in one case, relative to the presence of extra similarities in another. A priori, it
is not clear whether and how the two constraints should be traded off against each other.
We illustrate the pros and cons of two different ways of doing so.
To take into account the significance of distinctions, one could simply add a further
constraint to the BUC criterion that the cases must not have significant distinctions. Using
CATO’s background knowledge in this manner sometimes leads to more discriminating
relevance assessment, as the following example illustrates. In National Rejectors, the
problem situation presented above, the court held for the defendant, relying primarily on
Yokana, a case won by the defendant: “[W]e do find some significant parallels between
the facts of this case and those of Midland-Ross Corporation v. Yokana (D.C.N.J.), 185
F.Supp. 594.” The court’s decision for the defendant and the central role that Yokana played
in its reasoning cannot be explained solely on the basis of the BUC criterion. In National
Rejectors, the set of best untrumped cases, that is, cases in CATO’s Case Database that
satisfy the BUC criterion, includes 4 cases won by the plaintiff and 10 cases won by the
defendant, including Yokana. Thus, based on the BUC criterion, we conclude that both
sides have a strong argument. The fact that more pro-defendant cases than pro-plaintiff
cases satisfy the BUC criterion makes no difference, since simple counts of relevant cases
cannot be used as a premise in a convincing legal argument.
If we employ CATO’s methods for reasoning about the significance of the distinctions,
however, we can explain why the court in National Rejectors focused on Yokana and
held for the defendant. All 14 cases that satisfy the BUC criterion have (multiple)
distinctions. A number of the pro-defendant cases, including Yokana, do not have
significant distinctions, as can be ascertained using CATO’s methods: CATO finds
arguments downplaying the significance of all of Yokana’s distinctions and no arguments
emphasizing them. On the other hand, all four pro-plaintiff cases that satisfy the BUC
criterion have at least one significant distinction, according to CATO’s criterion. Thus,
the example illustrates that one way of using CATO’s arguments about the significance of
distinctions can lead to more discriminating relevance assessment, namely, by narrowing
down the set of case that satisfy the BUC criterion to include only the cases that have no
significant distinctions. We will call this method BUC/NoSignDist.
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Goodrich Motorola (d)
= F2 Bribe-Employee (p) = F2 Bribe-Employee (p)
= F4 Agreed-Not-To-Disclose (p) = F4 Agreed-Not-To-Disclose (p)
= F5 Agreement-Not-Specific (d) = F5 Agreement-Not-Specific (d)
= F6 Security-Measures (p) = F6 Security-Measures (p)
** F20 Info-Known-To-Competitors (d)
** F27 Disclosure-In-Public-Forum (d)
Goodrich Eastern Marble (p)
F2 Bribe-Employee (p) = F4 Agreed-Not-To-Disclose (p)
= F4 Agreed-Not-To-Disclose (p) = F5 Agreement-Not-Specific (d)
= F5 Agreement-Not-Specific (d) = F6 Security-Measures (p)
= F6 Security-Measures (p) * F15 Unique-Product (p)
Fig. 16. Comparison of the Goodrich problem situation to two precedent cases, Motorola (top) and Eastern
Marble (bottom). “*” means an insignificant distinction, “**” indicates a significant distinction.
A second example illustrates a potential limitation of this method and presents an
alternative method. Implicit in the BUC criterion (and by extension, the BUC/NoSignDist
criterion) is an assumption that the cases that are most similar to a given problem have to
be found among the cases that have a maximum set of similarities. However, there may be
times when the cases with the most inclusive set of similarities have significant distinctions,
whereas some cases with fewer similarities do not. On balance, those cases may be more
attractive, but they will not satisfy the BUC criterion.
Compare Goodrich, a case won by the plaintiff, to two precedent cases: Motorola, won
by the defendant, and Eastern Marble won by the plaintiff. Comparisons of the factors
of each of the precedent cases to those of Goodrich are shown in Fig. 16. Motorola is
more on point than Eastern Marble: it has all factors that Eastern Marble shares with
Goodrich (namely, F4, F5, and F6) and shares an additional factor with Goodrich, F2,
Bribe-Employee. If the plaintiff in Goodrich drew an analogy between Goodrich and
Eastern Marble, the defendant could “trump” plaintiff’s point by citing Motorola as a
more on point counterexample [7,8]. Consequently, Eastern Marble does not satisfy the
BUC criterion. As it turns out, Motorola is the only case in CATO’s Case Database that
satisfies this criterion. Therefore, the use of the BUC criterion would lead one to predict,
incorrectly, that Goodrich would be won by the defendant. The BUC/NoSignDist criterion
introduced above also does not fully explain the pro-plaintiff result in Goodrich. No case
satisfies this criterion. In particular, Motorola, the only case that satisfies the BUC criterion,
has two significant distinctions and thus does not qualify.
On reflection, it is not appropriate to consider Motorola to be more relevant than Eastern
Marble. Motorola has two distinctions, compared to Goodrich, both of which are signifi-
cant: CATO finds arguments emphasizing them but finds no arguments to downplay them.
By contrast, Eastern Marble’s sole distinction, F15, Unique-Product, is insignificant. But
if the absence of factor F2 in Eastern Marble does not amount to a significant distinction
(in fact, it does not amount to a distinction at all, as shown in Fig. 16), then why would
the presence of that factor in Motorola be reason to consider Motorola to be more relevant
than Eastern Marble, as the BUC method would indicate? It is desirable and appropriate
to attribute less weight to the presence of the extra factor F2 in Motorola and more weight
to the fact that it has significant distinctions, whereas Eastern Marble does not.
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We introduce a new criterion for selecting the best cases that considers the absence
of significant distinctions in one case to be more important than the presence of extra
similarities in another. In applying this criterion, one first selects the cases without
significant distinctions. Then from among those, one selects the ones that are most on
point. We call this method NoSignDist/BUC. Under this criterion, Eastern Marble, not
Motorola, is the more relevant precedent in Goodrich. Therefore, on the basis of this new
criterion we can explain the pro-plaintiff outcome in Goodrich.
In sum, the two examples illustrate two different ways in which CATO’s method for
making context-sensitive arguments about the significance of distinctions might be used to
improve the assessment of the relevance of cases. In the next section, we present results
of an evaluation study investigating to what extent these examples are representative of a
wider range of cases.
7. Evaluation study 1: Predictive accuracy and the use of background knowledge
One way to evaluate CATO’s arguments, or its judgments of case relevance, would be
to gather a representative sample of CATO’s output, and compare it against arguments or
relevance judgments produced by legal experts or competent novices. An evaluation of
this type is presented in the next section. The downside of this type of evaluation is that
it is very labor-intensive. One needs to have experts and/or competent novices analyze a
problem, read the opinions or squibs of relevant cases, and write a legal brief. Even in
its simplest form, this task takes several hours. Ideally, one would have multiple graders
assess the results. It is often infeasible to use this method to do comparative evaluations of
different ways of generating arguments.
A useful supplementary approach is to look at how well a program predicts the
outcome of cases, based on its arguments or judgments of case relevance. Good predictive
performance would inspire confidence that the arguments made by the program are good
arguments that have some relation to the reality of legal reasoning. Perhaps a focus on
predicting case outcomes is surprising, given that the primary goal of interpretive CBR
programs like CATO is to make arguments, not predictions. However, argumentation
and prediction are closely tied in programs for case-based argumentation such as CATO.
Typically, in the process of constructing arguments, these programs select the most relevant
cases that each side can cite to support the strongest possible argument. To apply them
to the task of predicting case outcomes, all that needs to be done is equip them with a
simple decision rule, namely, that a given side wins if the most relevant cases all favor
that side. Given this close tie between argumentation and prediction, it would reflect
positively on an argumentation model if it could be applied to make accurate predictions
of case outcomes. On the other hand, not every procedure that leads to good classification
performance necessarily produces good arguments. We therefore recommend using this
evaluation procedure in combination with methods that focus on the rhetorical structure
and quality of arguments, as we do in the current paper.
We conducted an experiment to investigate whether CATO’s background knowledge
enables it better to predict the outcome of cases, as compared to methods for assessing
the relevance of cases that do not involve the use of background knowledge, such as the
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BUC criterion [7,8]. What level of performance to expect is an open question. Predicting
the outcome of legal cases is a notoriously difficult problem. In CATO, this difficulty is
compounded by the fact that the case database contains cases from different jurisdictions
and time periods and involving a wide range of procedural settings. Further, some cases
were decided based on the Restatement 1st of Torts, others under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. With such a heterogeneous mix of cases, one does not expect to see perfect
classification performance. Therefore, in the evaluation study, we compared CATO’s
methods not only against interpretive CBR methods not relying on background knowledge,
but also against standard inductive learning algorithms. These programs do not generate
arguments, so in that sense they are not comparable, but they do help to get a sense of how
easy or difficult it is to predict the outcome of the cases in CATO’s database.
7.1. Evaluated methods
The experiment had two main goals: to find out how CATO’s methods compare to
(a) the BUC criterion [7,8] described above, a well-established relevance criterion for
selecting the best cases to cite when working with factor-based representations of cases
which does not involve the use of background knowledge and (b) three standard inductive
learning algorithms. In addition, the experiment had two more specific goals. First, we
wanted to know how CATO’s methods can best be employed to predict case outcomes—in
particular, how much weight to give to the absence of significant distinctions in one case,
compared to the presence of extra similarities in another, an issue that was illustrated in the
two examples shown above. Second, we wanted to investigate whether any improvement
seen due to the use of background knowledge could also have been obtained by simpler
methods that take into account whether cases have distinctions but do not reason about the
significance of the distinctions.
We evaluated the performance of 7 different CBR methods for predicting case
outcomes, each based on a different criterion for selecting the most relevant cases. Each
method uses its relevance criterion, R, as follows:
find all cases that satisfy relevance criterion R
if there are cases that satisfy R and all of them were won by the same side
then predict that this side wins
otherwise, abstain
The relevance criteria, shown in Table 1, used can be divided into three groups.
The first “group” comprises a single criterion, the BUC criterion discussed above,
which serves as a control against which to evaluate the improvement (if any) due to
CATO’s background knowledge. This methods considers only the similarities of cases.
It does not take into account the significance of distinctions or whether the cases have
distinctions.
The second group contains three methods that rely on CATO’s background knowledge
and reasoning about the significance of distinctions. They combine reasoning about the
significance of distinctions with (components of) the BUC criterion. These methods
differ in the weight that they give to extra similarities in one case, as compared to the
absence of significant distinctions in another. First, the NoSignDist/Cit criterion considers
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Table 1
Relevance criteria used for selecting the best cases
A. Criterion used as control
1. BUC Best untrumped cases
B. Criteria that require that cases have no significant distinctions
2. NoSignDist/Cit Citable cases that have no significant distinctions
3. NoSignDist/BUC Of the citable cases without significant distinctions,
those that are most on point and untrumped, by citable
cases without significant distinctions
4. BUC/NoSignDist Of the best untrumped cases, those that have no
significant distinctions
C. Criteria that require that cases have no significant distinctions—these criteria do not involve
the use of background knowledge
5. NoDist/Cit Citable cases that have no distinctions (mirrors crite-
rion 2)
6. NoDist/BUC Of the citable cases without distinctions, those that
are most on point and untrumped, by citable cases
without distinctions (mirrors criterion 3)
7. BUC/NoDist Of the best untrumped cases, those that have no
distinctions (mirrors criterion 4)
as most relevant those cases that (1) have no significant distinctions, meaning that any
distinctions that they may have can be downplayed and cannot be emphasized and (2)
satisfy HYPO’s minimum criterion for a case being citable in an argument [7,8], namely,
that they share with the problem at least one factor that favors the side that won that
case. The NoSignDist/Cit does not place much emphasis on similarities, requiring only
that cases have a minimal set of similarities in common with the problem. The second
criterion, NoSignDist/BUC, which was illustrated in the Goodrich example, places more
emphasis on similarities than the previous one, but still considers the absence of significant
distinctions to be of greater importance than the presence of extra similarities. The cases
that satisfy the NoSignDist/BUC criterion can be selected in two steps: first, one selects
the cases that have no significant distinctions, as defined above. From among those cases,
one selects the ones that satisfy the BUC criterion. The third criterion, BUC/NoSignDist,
finally, gives more weight to the presence of extra similarities than the previous two.
Under this criterion, cases are required to have maximum sets of similarities and not to
have significant distinctions. This method was illustrated in the National Rejectors/Yokana
example. When using the BUC/NoSignDist, the steps for selecting the best cases are
reversed, as compared to NoSignDist/BUC: One first selects the cases that satisfy the BUC
criterion and then from among those, selects the ones that have no significant distinctions.
Both methods, NoSignDist/BUC and BUC/NoSignDist, are justifiable a priori, as discussed
in the context of the two examples given above.
The third group contains methods that take into account whether or not a case has
distinctions, but do not rely on reasoning about the significance of the distinctions. We
include these methods to ascertain that any improvements that we may see, due to
CATO’s arguments about the significance of distinctions, could not have been obtained
in a more straightforward manner. Thus, for each method that requires that cases have no
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significant distinctions, we include a corresponding method that requires that the cases
have no distinctions. For example, the NoDist/Cit criterion focuses on cases that have
no distinctions and satisfy the minimum criterion for being citable in an argument. It is
analogous to the NoSignDist/Cit criterion.
In addition to the 7 CBR methods, we evaluated the performance of three standard
inductive learning methods, ID3, k-NN, and Naïve Bayes, described in [48], in order to get
a sense of how difficult it is to classify the cases in CATO’s database.
7.2. Experimental procedure
The experiment was carried out with a case database that contained 184 trade secrets
cases. Of these cases, 107 (58%) were won by the plaintiff, 77 (42%) by the defendant.
The cases are represented using a set of 26 factors, half of which favor the plaintiff, half
of which favor the defendant. On average, each case has 4.1± 1.6 applicable factors. Each
factor applies in 29± 22 cases. Leave-one-out cross-validation was performed for each of
the 10 methods described above. For k-NN, we used k = 5 and computed the similarity of
two cases as the number of shared factors minus the number of factors that applied in one
case but not in the other. For each method we computed the percentage of cases that were
classified correctly, incorrectly, and were not classified. The results are shown in Fig. 17.
As a baseline to interpret the performance of the classification methods, one might consider
that a method that predicts for every case that the plaintiff wins will be 58% accurate.
Fig. 17. Classification performance of 10 CBR and machine learning methods.
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7.3. ResultsWe found substantial performance differences between the seven CBR methods (see
Fig. 17). The differences were due mostly to the frequency with which the methods make
predictions and to a lesser degree to the accuracy of the predictions. The percentage of
cases for which the methods generate predictions ranges from 48 to 89%, or 69 to 89% if
we disregard one outlier. The accuracy of the predictions ranges from 84 to 92%.
We used McNemar’s test to determine whether the differences that were observed
between the methods are statistically significant, as was recommended in a number of
recent papers [31,60]. This test is essentially a Sign Test and compares the number of
cases on which one algorithm does better against the number of cases on which the other
algorithm does better. We consider a correct prediction to be better than no prediction,
which in turn we consider to be better than an incorrect prediction. Using McNemar’s test
we ascertained that four of the six CBR methods performed significantly better than the
baseline. The exceptions were BUC/NoSignDist, which was only marginally better, (#BA
= 71, #AB = 49, p < 0.1)5 and BUC/NoDist, which performed on par with the baseline.
The BUC criterion, the standard against which to measure improvement, classified 69%
of the cases, abstaining on the rest. When it made a prediction, it was 92% accurate. With
5% incorrect predictions it had the lowest error rate of all methods tested, including the
inductive learning algorithms. Of all CBR methods tested, NoSignDist/BUC performed
best. It classified 89% of the cases and abstained on 11% of the cases. The predictions that
it made were 88% accurate. The difference between this method and the BUC criterion used
as control was statistically significant (#BA = 17, #AB= 33, p < 0.05). A second method
that applied background knowledge, NoSignDist/Cit, also performed better than BUC, but
the difference was not statistically significant (#BA = 21, #AB = 34, p < 0.11). The only
method using background knowledge that did worse than BUC is BUC/NoSignDist. The
difference with BUC is marginally significant (#BA = 38, #AB = 24, p < 0.1).
The CBR methods that take into account the significance of distinctions did better than
the corresponding methods that take into account the presence or absence of distinctions
without reasoning about their significance. The difference between BUC/NoSignDist and
its corresponding method, BUC/NoDist, was statistically significant (#BA = 7, #AB =
40, p < 0.0001), but, as mentioned, neither of these methods was clearly better than
the baseline. The difference between NoSignDist/BUC and NoDist/BUC was marginally
significant (#BA = 10, #AB = 21, p < 0.1). The difference between NoSignDist/Cit and
NoDist/Cit was not statistically significant.
Of the inductive learning programs, Naïve Bayes performed best, classifying 90% of
the problems correctly and the rest incorrectly. k-NN was 84% accurate, ID3 81%. The
difference between Naïve Bayes and the best-performing CBR method, NoSignDist/BUC,
was statistically significant (#BA = 27, #AB = 10, p < 0.01). On the other hand, the
difference between the NoSignDist/BUC and the other two inductive learning programs
was not statistically significant. These two inductive learning programs make more correct
predictions than NoSignDist/BUC, but also commit more errors.
5 #BA indicates the number of cases on which one method did better than the other. #AB indicates the number
of cases in which it was the other way around.
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7.4. DiscussionOn the basis of these results, the question whether CATO’s background knowledge helps
to make better predictions of the outcome of trade secrets cases, compared to CBR methods
that do not apply background knowledge, can be answered affirmatively. NoSignDist/BUC,
of the methods that employ background knowledge the one that performed best, was
significantly better than the BUC method used as control, which does not apply background
knowledge.
Not all CBR methods that applied background knowledge were equally effective.
The methods that give more weight to the absence of significant distinctions in one
case, as compared to the presence of extra similarities in another (NoSignDist/BUC and
NoSignDist/Cit) did better than the methods that give more weight to extra similarities
(BUC and BUC/NoSignDist). As mentioned, the difference between NoSignDist/BUC
and BUC is statistically significant. Also, both NoSignDist/BUC and NoSignDist/Cit did
significantly better than BUC/NoSignDist (#BA = 4, #AB = 35, p < 0.0001 and #BA =
10, #AB= 38, p < 0.0001). These results lend support to the argument made in context of
the Goodrich example, namely, that an extra similarity of one case that is not a significant
distinction of another case should not carry too much weight in deciding which of those
cases is more relevant. The results indicate also that the Goodrich/Motorola/Eastern
Marble example is more typical than the National Rejectors/Yokana example. What is
unusual about the Goodrich example however is the fact that the BUC criterion (the method
used as control) generates an incorrect prediction. As mentioned, the BUC criterion had
the lowest error rate of all methods tested. Far more frequently, when NoSignDist/BUC
(the best-performing CBR method) did better than BUC, it was because BUC abstained,
having found cases won by both sides that satisfied the criterion. Thus, the main reason
that CATO’s background knowledge enables it to perform better on the prediction task is
not because it helps to avoid errors but because it affords more discriminating assessment
of the similarity of cases.
The two CBR methods that give more weight to the presence of extra similarities, as
compared to the absence of significant differences, abstained on a high number of cases,
31% for both methods. However, the reason for abstaining was different. When BUC
abstained, 98% of the time it was because there were cases won by both sides that satisfied
the criterion. On the other hand, when BUC/NoSignDist abstained, 88% of the time it was
because no cases satisfied the criterion. While BUC/NoSignDist may seem attractive from
a theoretical viewpoint, as illustrated in the National Rejectors/Yokana example above, as a
practical matter it puts the bar too high. As it tries to have the best of both worlds, namely,
cases that have a maximum set of the factors that apply in the problem and that do not
have significant distinctions, it frequently comes up empty, as illustrated in the Goodrich
example.
The results of the experiment suggest, but do not prove conclusively, that the
improvement in classification performance due to the use of background knowledge could
not have been achieved with simpler CBR methods that consider only whether there are
distinctions but do not reason about the significance of the distinctions. The main evidence
is the fact that the difference between NoSignDist/BUC, the best-performing method that
reasons about the significance of distinctions, and NoDist/BUC, the corresponding method
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that considers only whether there are distinctions, was marginally significant. It will be
interesting to investigate whether the advantage of reasoning about the significance of
distinctions will be more pronounced with smaller sets of cases. We predict they will be,
as the requirement that cases have no distinctions is likely to be too strict when fewer cases
are available.
As expected, the results of the inductive learning programs confirm that the cases in
CATO’s database present a challenging classification problem. The greatest surprise was
the good performance of Naïve Bayes. Apparently, this method is better able than the
CBR methods to take advantage of the information available in the cases. The other
inductive learning programs did not perform significantly better than the best CBR method.
Perhaps they would have done better than they did if a significant effort had been made
to tune them, but this possibility was not pursued. (Naïve Bayes however does not
have any parameters that can be tuned.) The better performance of Naïve Bayes may
be due to the fact that the CBR methods are subject to more stringent requirements:
they must not only predict the outcome of a given problem, but must also explain its
predictions by means of persuasive legal arguments. The inductive learning programs
are not subject to this requirement. The fact that Naïve Bayes outperformed the CBR
methods indicates that there is room for improvement. Perhaps these methods miss
opportunities for emphasizing or downplaying the significance of certain distinctions.
Perhaps what is needed is a more context-sensitive way of trading off the absence of
significant differences and the presence of extra similarities—the methods tested in the
experiment rely on static ways of doing so. If more context-sensitive methods can be
found, it will be interesting to compare their performance to that of Naïve Bayes. As it
stands, if the sole objective were to achieve high classification accuracy, Naïve Bayes
would be the method of choice. However, our primary interest is argumentation and in
what the experiment says about CATO’s argument about the significance of distinctions.
The fact that CATO’s arguments add predictive value, or help explain the outcome of
cases, as compared to CBR methods that do not apply background knowledge, inspires
confidence that they are sound. Apparently, at an aggregate level, arguments about the
significance of distinctions capture something significant about the way legal cases are
decided.
8. The CATO instructional environment
Let us now turn to the question whether CATO’s argumentation model can be used to
support effective computer-based instruction. CATO is an intelligent learning environment,
designed to help beginning law students learn basic skills of making arguments with
cases. CATO supports practice of two main tasks, theory-testing (induction) and written
argumentation (reasoning by analogy). In the theory-testing task, the students are given
a general statement about what the law might say and then test this statement against
past cases, which they retrieve from CATO’s Case Database. In the argumentation
task, students create a written argument about a problem situation, supported by
cites to past cases selected from CATO’s database. In the process of creating their
argument, they study argumentation examples generated dynamically by CATO. The
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CATO environment helps to make the students’ tasks more manageable: it suppresses
some of the distracting complexity that would complicate the use in the same instructional
context of standard legal research tools and resources. The CATO environment uses its
argumentation model primarily to generate examples and to make explicit the underlying
structure of arguments. Unlike many intelligent tutoring systems [5,71], CATO does
not use its model as a standard against which to evaluate students’ solutions, with
the exception of two small subtasks. If successful, CATO will address an urgent need
in American law schools, since legal writing instruction is important and requires a
considerable amount of (human) resources, often more than law schools are able to
provide.
We evaluated how effective instruction with CATO is, compared to the best traditional
way of teaching argumentation skills. In the United States, argumentation skills are taught
in law schools classrooms by engaging students in a Socratic dialogue, in which a professor
leads students through interesting arguments, case comparisons, and hypothetical problems
to explore the ramifications of landmark cases and other legal sources.
The experiment evaluating CATO is interesting from the perspective of research in
the field of AI and Education, because it tests the effectiveness of an example-based,
component-wise approach to teaching argumentation skills, a relatively low-cost way
of developing an instructional system for a difficult domain. The experiment is also
interesting from a more theoretical perspective: Example-studying can be an effective
learning method [28]. A number of example-based intelligent learning environments have
been developed [25,29,34,63], but to our knowledge, none for teaching argumentation
skills. While a number of other instructional systems have been developed for the legal
domain [26,49,58,64,66], they have focused only to a limited extent on argumentation
and have not focused on reasoning with cases. Further, those that provide feedback to
students do so on the assumption that the correctness of a solution offered by the student
can be determined by objective criteria, a strong assumption to make in many parts
of the legal domain. In this respect these programs are rather different from CATO,
which does not make this assumption, using its model to provide examples (for the
most part) rather than feedback. Many intelligent learning environments for domains
other than the law use case-based reasoning for a large variety of purposes, such as
teaching by story telling [32,33,38,61], student modeling [70], retrieval by students of
software code for re-use [27], semi-automatic grading of student work [68], initiating
discussion among experts [37], and generating problems of appropriate difficulty [72].
Yet none of these systems engaged students in a process of comparing and contrasting
cases in order to make arguments about how a problem should be decided, as does
CATO.
The study evaluating the effectiveness of the instruction with CATO, apart from
addressing an important question of interest to the research field of AI and Education, also
involves further evaluation of the CATO model. First, if CATO’s arguments turn out to be
pedagogically useful, that result would provide further evidence that they capture important
aspects of the arguments that human experts make. Second, during the evaluation study
we compared CATO’s arguments in a more direct way to arguments made by competent
novices, by having a legal writing instructor grade written argumentation assignments
completed by each.
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CATO Database — Contains textual summaries (squibs) and factor sets for 147 trade secrets
cases. The query language lets students retrieve cases with any boolean combination of factors.
Factor Browser — Provides information about CATO’s set of 26 factors for trade secrets law.
Case Analyzer — Lets students compile a list of applicable factors for a case and generates
feedback, comparing student’s list of factors to that stored in the CATO Database for same case.
Argument Maker — Presents argumentation examples in the context of the student’s on-going
work. Also, conducts mini-dialogs to give students practice in identifying distinctions.
Issue-Based Argument Window — Presents examples of arguments (organized by issues) with
multiple cases selected by students.
Squib Reader — Displays squibs of retrieved cases.
Fig. 18. Tools offered by the CATO program.
In the current section, we present an overview of the CATO intelligent learning
environment and describe in some detail the theory-testing and argumentation tasks that
it supports. In the next section, we present the results of the evaluation study.
8.1. Overview of the instruction with CATO
The CATO learning environment comprises a set of six tools, listed in Fig. 18, including
a database of cases, tools that display information about retrieved cases that helps in
interpreting the cases, and tools for displaying argumentation examples. At the time of
the evaluation study of CATO, the Case Database contained 147 trade secrets cases.
For each case, the database contains a list of applicable factors and a “squib”, that is,
a short textual summary of the court’s opinion, the official record in which the court
describes the case facts and explains its decision. The fact that students have access to
factor representations of cases and squibs is an important difference with standard legal
information retrieval systems, which contain only the full opinions of cases. Another
key difference is that students can ask CATO to generate argumentation examples. Upon
students’ request, CATO’s Argument Maker, shown in Fig. 19 together with the Case
Database window, displays examples of five different Basic Argument Moves, annotated
to reveal the structure of the argument. Another tool, the Issue-Based Argument Window,
presents, also upon students’ request, arguments about a problem with any set of cases
retrieved from the Case Database. Finally, CATO provides feedback to students related to
two subtasks of the argumentation task: CATO’s Case Analyzer lets students analyze a
problem situation by selecting applicable factors and provides feedback on their choice of
factors. Also, CATO’s Argument Maker conducts a Mini Dialog to help students learn
to distinguish cases, in particular, to help them to learn to differentiate between mere
differences and real distinctions. Examples are shown in [1,2]. Recent work has shown
that students’ learning improves when role playing and courtroom drama are added to the
Mini Dialogs [11].
We organized the instruction with CATO, 7.5 hours total, around a rather traditional
casebook chapter for trade secrets law—many law school textbooks are casebooks.
The Casebook contains a short introduction to trade secrets law, the opinions of five
leading trade secrets cases, and a number of case squibs. The Casebook also contains a
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number of argumentation problems designed to be carried out with CATO or without.6
We also created a set of a set of four Workbooks, which contain brief descriptions of
the argumentation skills addressed by the CATO curriculum, tutorials on how to use
CATO’s tools, and instructions on how to use CATO to carry out the theory-testing and
argumentation tasks posed in the Casebook.
8.2. First task students practice with CATO: Theory testing
In theory-testing problems, students test a general hypothesis of what the law might say
against the cases in CATO’s Case Database. They revise the theory if it turns out not to
be consistent with the cases. The Workbook instructions outline a 4-step process. First, the
students are presented with a statement describing a general class of fact scenarios. The
two scenarios that were tested during the instruction with CATO are shown in Fig. 20.
They are asked to predict which side would win in the given kind of fact scenario, the
plaintiff or the defendant. Second, the students frame a query to retrieve cases from CATO’s
6 The argumentation problems had been developed using a module of CATO specifically designed to this
purpose. For more information on experiments to select small sets of cases for use in argumentation instruction
semi-automatically, see [10].
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Suppose a defendant to whom confidential information was disclosed knew that the
information was confidential, but there was not written nondisclosure agreement. Is the
defendant under an obligation not to use or disclose the information?
Suppose a plaintiff disclosed confidential information in negotiations with a defendant,
but the plaintiff never told the defendant that the information was confidential and there
was no written nondisclosure agreement. Is the defendant under an obligation not to use
or disclose the information?
Fig. 20. Theories students explored using CATO.
Case Database that are relevant to their theory. This means that they must “translate” the
theory into the language of factors. This translation step is rather direct, since the theory is
essentially stated at the level of factors. Third, the students consider whether the retrieved
cases confirm or disconfirm the theory. To this end they determine whether any retrieved
cases are inconsistent with their prediction—easy to do since CATO sorts the retrieved
cases based on outcome, whether the plaintiff or the defendant won. If there are seemingly
inconsistent cases, the students must investigate whether these cases invalidate the theory
or whether they are outside the realm of the theory and hence pose no threat. In determining
what a case says about a theory, it is useful to construct an explanation for the case’s
outcome. As a first step, the students can look at the list of applicable factors of a case,
displayed by CATO upon request, to get an initial idea of what the case means. They can
evaluate whether the case has any additional factors not mentioned in the query that might
be reason to consider the case to be outside of the realm of the theory. They can read
the squib of the case in order to get more detailed information and to confirm the initial
interpretation of the case. If there are inconsistent cases that cannot be explained away,
students modify the theory as needed, for example by adding conditions, and they can then
repeat the steps to test the modified theory.
The theory-testing exercises that students carry out with CATO are a useful type of
exercises. At first blush, a focus on formulating and testing generalizations may seem odd
in the context of teaching a process of reasoning by analogy, especially since the need for
analogical reasoning in the legal domain is motivated often by saying that there are few
useful generalizations in this domain and that generalizations often have exceptions. In
part, the theory-testing exercises are meant to illustrate exactly that point, that is, that it
is difficult to form generalizations that are perfectly consistent with all cases. But there is
no question that the generalizations themselves are important. Even though cases are the
superior authorities in common law domains, common law rules do exist and are used
by legal professionals [24], for example, to organize arguments. Thus, attorneys often
formulate theories and test them against available cases.
As compared to working with real-world resources for legal research and analysis, this
type of exercise is simplified in CATO, but simplified in a pedagogically useful way. CATO
helps make the task more manageable than if it were done with a standard legal information
retrieval system. Available systems offer a wide range of very extensive case law databases,
which contain case opinions but contain neither factor representations of cases nor squibs,
as does CATO’s Case Database. These databases can be searched using full-text retrieval
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methods.7 While they are extremely useful tools, it can be far more difficult to find cases
that are relevant to a given theory with a standard legal information retrieval system than it
is with CATO, at least for those areas of the law for which a CATO Case Database exists.
For example, to find cases that have factor F1 Disclosure-In-Negotiations, one might try a
query like “disclosure (disclosed) in negotiations”. However, if a case matched this query,
there is a likelihood but by no means a guarantee that the corresponding factor actually
applies. The terms mentioned in the query may occur in other contexts than anticipated.
Further, even when the given factor does apply in a given case, the terms mentioned in the
query to describe the factor may not occur in the case opinion, for various reasons. These
problems occur frequently and are compounded when—as happens frequently when using
CATO—one runs queries that involve multiple factors. Thus, one must read and interpret
the opinions of the retrieved cases in order to find out which factors apply and whether
they were won by the plaintiff or the defendant. This process can be very time-consuming,
since the case opinions tend to be long documents and are not easy to read for novices.
Quite often, the net result of that effort will be that the given case does not have the factors
that one is looking for and therefore is not relevant to the problem at hand!
In the CATO environment, on the other hand, much of this distracting complexity is
removed. Retrieved cases are guaranteed to have the factors specified in the query and one
can easily find out which other factors apply and which side won. It is therefore easier to
zoom in on relevant cases and to get an initial indication of what a retrieved case means and
whether it is relevant. By inspecting the applicable factors of cases, students can judiciously
select case squibs for reading. Thus, they can focus on making arguments with cases, not on
reading the full opinions of cases that end up not making a contribution to their arguments.
We realize that there is value in having students grapple with the complexity of full-text
retrieval and complete case opinions. But that is the next step. Practice with CATO is meant
to prepare students for this next step. In all likelihood, the development of algorithms for
automatically spotting factors in the text of case opinions [23] will open up interesting
opportunities to integrate activities with full-text retrieval systems into the instruction with
CATO.
8.3. Second task students practice with CATO: Argumentation guided by examples
The second main task that students carry out with CATO is an argumentation task,
in which the students are given a problem situation and create a written outline of
the best arguments that the plaintiff and the defendant can make, supported by cites
to cases that they select from CATO’s Case Database. The arguments are supposed
to be of comparable complexity as CATO’s Issue-Based Arguments presented earlier.
The Workbook instructions provide much guidance. This type of argumentation task is
both realistic and important: Much of what legal professionals do is analyzing the legal
consequences of a problem and presenting that analysis in writing, in a memo or brief.
First-year law students usually practice this kind of task a few times as part of their legal
7 There are many different types of full-text retrieval systems (e.g., Boolean, vector space, and probabilistic
retrieval). They have in common that a document is considered relevant and is retrieved to the extent that terms
mentioned in the query (and perhaps other words based on the same “stem”) appear in the document [59,67].
224 V. Aleven / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 183–237
writing instruction. After that, they may get more practice during their internships but
seldom as part of the regular law school curriculum.
As part of the argumentation task, students study argumentation examples, which
are generated dynamically by CATO. They use CATO’s argumentation examples as
models for their own arguments and evaluate their own arguments by comparing them
against comparable arguments generated by CATO. Because the examples are generated
dynamically, they can be more relevant to the students’ on-going work than if pre-stored
examples were used. The examples generated by CATO involve the problem situation that
the students are analyzing and cases that they may consider citing in their arguments. Also,
CATO tailors the examples to the students’ analysis of the problem, as explained below.
Thus, the examples are relevant to the argumentation task at hand, which may heighten the
students’ interest in the examples and make it easier for them to use the examples as models
for their own arguments. Further, CATO annotates the examples to show their underlying
structure, revealing argumentation concepts such as relevant similarities, differences, focal
abstractions, etc. In this way, CATO reifies argument structure that is not visible in a
more traditional instructional setting. For example, when a law professor engages a class
of students in a Socratic dialog, arguments and counterarguments follow each other in
rapid succession. There is usually little time to stop and think about the structure of
the arguments. Nor do textbooks on legal argumentation describe in much depth how,
for example, a student might make an effective argument that distinctions are or are not
significant. The use of CATO may provide a better opportunity for students to reflect
upon the structure of arguments, as illustrated by the transcripts of students’ explaining
argumentation examples generated by CATO, shown in Aleven [1, p. 125ff]. Reification of
reasoning structures has been successful in several intelligent tutoring systems [39,62].
The first activity in the argumentation task is to read the facts of the given problem,
which is based on the Alabama case Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So.2d 130
(Ala.Civ.App.1987). The students identify the factors that apply, using CATO’s Case
Analyzer tool, which lets them browse information about CATO’s set of factors and select
the factors they think apply in Mason. This tool also provides feedback, comparing the
factors selected by the students to its own set of factors for Mason. The purpose of this
feedback is not to make sure that the students arrive at a “correct” set of factors for
Mason—we do not think a single correct set exists—but rather to help them in interpreting
the meaning of the factors.
As they work on constructing on argument that plaintiff should win in Mason, students
study argumentation examples generated by CATO in a series of increasingly complex
contexts. Initially, they study introductory examples of five basic argument moves:
(1) Analogizing a problem to a past case, (2) distinguishing a problem and a past case,
(3), (4) downplaying and emphasizing the significance of distinctions, and (5) arguing that
weaknesses in a fact situation are not fatal. The students read a general description of
each argument move in the Workbooks. They then use CATO’s Argument Maker tool to
generate examples suggested by the Workbooks. Each example involves a comparison of
the current problem situation, Mason, and a case that the students select from CATO’s
Case Database, following the instructions in the Workbook. The examples are based on
the students’ analysis of Mason, that is, the set of applicable factors that they selected,
so as to make them maximally relevant to the students’ on-going work. CATO annotates
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the examples to reveal the underlying structure. As illustrated in Fig. 19, in the top pane
of the Argument Maker window, it lists the applicable factors of the problem and the
selected case, marking the similarities and distinctions. In the middle pane, CATO shows
information about how relevant argumentation concepts apply to the current comparison
of cases. For some argument moves, it also displays an argument template. In the bottom
pane, finally, CATO displays an argument in English. The students also use the Argument
Maker window to engage in a Mini Dialog, in which they practice the skill of distinguishing
cases.
In the next phase, the students study argumentation examples in a more complex
context, namely, as they search for cases that they can cite in their argument. This task
involves important legal research skills that law schools aim to teach. With CATO, students
practice a simplified version of the task, as compared to the “open research assignments”
which are often part of more traditional legal writing instruction. These assignments
typically require that students consult many different resources available in the law library.
CATO makes the task more manageable by removing distracting complexity, in much the
same way as it makes the students’ theory-testing tasks more manageable. Following the
instructions in the Workbook, the students practice two important general legal research
strategies, namely, to retrieve (a) cases that are “highly similar” to the problem at hand
and (b) cases that they can use to downplay weaknesses. They run queries to the CATO
Database to implement these strategies. These queries return cases that are likely to be
very useful to support an argument that the plaintiff or the defendant should win in Mason,
but there is still the need to evaluate the relevance of the retrieved cases in more detail. For
starters, the students can look at the applicable factors and the squibs of the retrieved cases,
to get an impression of what these cases mean, just as in the theory-testing exercises. The
students can also use CATO’s Argument Maker to help them implement a useful strategy
for evaluating the relevance of cases, namely, to play out the arguments that could be made
with the retrieved cases. At the end of this phase, the students usually have identified a
small set of cases that are most relevant to Mason.
Finally, students consider CATO’s argumentation examples in the most complex
context, namely, as they outline their argument on behalf of the plaintiff in Mason,
using the cases and other information gathered so far. In this phase, they study a
number of Issue-Based Arguments generated by CATO upon request. First, following
Workbook instructions, the students identify issues in Mason and compare their sets
of issues against those identified by CATO, which CATO presents in the form of
an Issue-Based Argument that does not cite any cases. Next, the students need to
decide how to use the cases they selected previously. They study an example Issue-
Based Argument generated by CATO with pre-selected cases, as suggested in one
of the Workbooks. Using CATO’s argument as model, the students generate a 1–2
page written argument outline with cites to relevant cases. Finally, students compare
their own argument outline to a third Issue-Based Argument. During the evaluation
study of CATO, we had planned that each pair of students would compare their
argument against one generated by CATO with the same cases that they had cited.
Such an argument would have been easy to generate using CATO and would have
made for a particularly relevant comparison. But time permitted us only to provide
a handout with arguments generated by CATO that was the same for each student.
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Nonetheless, it is an advantage of dynamic example generation that such a comparison
is possible.
In short, during the argumentation task, students studied a significant number of
argumentation examples. The examples were relevant to the student’s task at hand and,
in a simple way, were tailored to their analysis of the problem. This tailoring made it easier
for the students to use the examples as models for their own argument and to compare their
work against the examples. Further, the examples made explicit the underlying structure
of the arguments. During the CATO instruction, students have ample opportunity to study
and reflect on the reified structure, a significant advantage afforded by a computer-based
learning environment equipped with an argumentation model.
9. Evaluation study 2: Instructional effectiveness of CATO
We conducted an evaluation study to assess the effectiveness of the CATO instruction
in comparison to the best way of teaching the same basic argumentation skills by
traditional methods. In fact, as we will see, the control group instruction in this experiment
represents a more ideal instructional situation than that typically found in American
law school curricula. The experiment also provided an opportunity to evaluate CATO’s
Issue-Based Arguments by comparing them against those of the best students who
participated.
9.1. Subjects
The study was carried out in the context of a second-semester legal writing course at
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The subjects in the experiment were first-year
law students, recruited from those taking the course. Participation in the experiment was
recommended by the course instructor but was voluntary. Those students who elected to
participate were assigned randomly to an experimental group of 16 students and a control
group of 14 students. The students who elected not to participate in the experiment attended
the same instructional sessions as the control group. Each group was divided into 3 sections
of roughly equal size. The average class size in the control group was 8 students.
9.2. Procedure
The students in the experimental group worked through the CATO curriculum, which
consisted of the Casebook and Workbooks described previously. During a three-week
period, instead of attending their regular class meetings, they went to a CATO computer lab
in the law school set up specifically for the experiment. Each student worked with CATO
for nine 50-minute sessions for a total of 7.5 hours of instruction. After an introductory
classroom session, during which a human instructor (Kevin Ashley) introduced students to
CATO, factors, and Word Perfect, students collaborating in pairs used the CATO program
to work through theory-testing and argumentation problems, as described in the previous
sections.
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The control group instruction was designed to teach the same basic skills of making
arguments with cases in a traditional way, in the same amount of time as that covered by the
CATO instruction. The control group instruction was based on the same casebook and was
taught by an instructor who was not familiar with the CATO model. During four classroom
sessions, the course instructor used a Socratic method to present a framework of inquiry
for trade secret law, synthesized from the casebook cases. During two moot court sessions
led by the instructor, the students made oral arguments about two problem situations. The
instructor, combining the roles of “judge” and teacher, moderated the argument exchange.
The students prepared for these sessions outside of class, spending at least 75 minutes each
time.
9.3. Tests
To assess the improvement in students’ argumentation skills, we administered a
Basic Argument Skills pre-test and post-test, both in-class exams. Each test consisted
of argumentation problems, involving a problem situation and three cases, for which
squibs were presented. We also administered a second post-test designed to assess whether
students are able to transfer and use basic argumentation skills in a more complex task,
a Legal Memo-Writing Assignment. The students were given a problem situation and six
case squibs and were asked to produce a six-page memo, in which they stated the plaintiff’s
and the defendant’s strongest argument on the issues that they thought were raised by the
problem. Students had one week to complete this assignment. The tests and grading criteria
were created in consultation with the legal writing instructor who taught the control group.
All tests were graded in a blind test by the legal writing instructor. Without informing him,
we included in the materials to be graded a set of answers generated by the CATO program,
hand-written and formatted in a way so as to disguise the fact that they had been computer-
generated, but otherwise exactly as CATO had generated them. CATO’s answers to each
of these tests contained one or more Issue-Based Arguments.
9.4. Results
The results, presented in Table 2, indicate that on the Basic Argument Skills Tests,
both groups’ scores improved from pre-test to post-test. The letter grades were computed
by converting the numerical grades. In each group, the improvement was statistically
significant (experimental group: t (15)= −3.4, p = 0.004; control group: t (13)= −3.7,
p = 0.002). There was no significant difference between the groups in pre-test, post-test,
Table 2
Results of the basic argument skills tests and legal memo writing assignment
Basic argument skills Memo writing
Pre-test Post-test Prev Post-test
CATO group 60 C− 70 C+ 63 70 B−
Control group 55 D 68 C 63 79 B+
CATO’s arguments 81 B+ 87 A− 62 C
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or gain scores (pre-test: t (28) = 1.56, p = 0.13; post-test: t (28)= 0.57, p = 0.58; gain
scores: t (28)= −0.66, p = 0.51). CATO’s answers ranked among the best on the Basic
Argument Skills tests (see Table 2). CATO came in first on the pre-test and third on the
post-test, or fourth and sixth respectively if one focuses only on the first question, which
more students finished than the second.
On the Memo-Writing Assignment, the control group scores were higher than the scores
in the experimental group. The difference was statistically significant (t (25) = −2.38,
p = 0.03). No statistically significant difference existed between the groups on the writing
assignment of the previous semester (t (25) = 0.05, p = 0.96). CATO’s memo did not
receive a high grade.
9.5. Discussion
The results on the Basic Argument Skills Tests indicate that the CATO instruction leads
to a statistically significant improvement of students’ basic skills of making arguments
with cases, comparable to that achieved by an experienced legal writing instructor teaching
small groups of students. This result should be interpreted in light of the fact that the control
group instruction represents a very high standard of comparison. First, the subjects were
among the more difficult students to teach. They were enrolled in a program that provides
extra-intensive legal writing instruction. They had been selected for participation in this
program, by the law school’s admissions committee, on the basis of various indicators of
law school aptitude suggesting a need for special instruction. Second, the control group
instruction involved very small groups: 8 students on average. It therefore represents a far
more ideal situation than one normally finds in legal writing classes. Finally, the control
group instructor has excellent credentials. He is the director of the legal writing program at
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law as well as the special program described above.
Experienced in teaching such students, he is a dedicated teacher who enjoys an excellent
rapport with his students, as evidenced for example by the students’ enthusiasm for the oral
argument sessions. Seen in this light, the result that the instruction with CATO was equally
effective as the control group instruction is impressive.
On the other hand, the results on the Legal Memo-Writing Assignment show the
limits of CATO’s effectiveness. The Legal Memo-Writing Assignment was a transfer task,
going well beyond what students where asked to do during the experimental or control
group instruction. It posed a more advanced and complex task than the Basic Argument
Skills tests or the argumentation tasks students carried out with CATO. It involved more
cases and posed additional problems of selecting the best argument and composition.
The combined results on the Basic Argument Skills test and the Legal Memo-Writing
Assignment suggest that while both the experimental and control group learned basic skills
of making arguments with cases, the control group was better able to integrate these skills
in a more complex context.
In part, this difference may be due to the differences in instructional approach
between the two conditions. As mentioned, CATO teaches in a component-wise, example-
based manner and suppresses some distracting complexity. During the CATO instruction,
complexity was introduced gradually. Basic Argument Moves were addressed early on, the
more complex Issue-Based Arguments not until the last couple of sessions. Unfortunately,
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most students ran out of time while working on the more complex topics. The control group
instruction on the other hand did not reduce complexity and did not follow a component-
based approach. As is common in American law schools, the legal writing instructor who
taught the control group instruction taught the argumentation skills in a “holistic” way.
He discussed real cases and engaged students in arguments about these cases. He did not
discuss any methods for using cases in arguments.
The results of the experiment indicate that a component-wise, example-based approach
can be effective in helping students to learn basic argumentation skills. In this approach
there is time and opportunity for students to see and reflect on argument structure. At the
same time, a limitation of this approach seems to be that it provides less help than would be
ideal with the application of basic argumentation skills in a more complex context. Thus,
there is a need to make the instruction with CATO more “integrated”.
The comments that the instructor wrote on CATO’s memo provide us with much in-
formation about CATO’s Issue-Based Arguments. As we had found in earlier experiments
[4], CATO’s answers on the Basic Argument Skills Tests are on par with those of the best
students. As mentioned, CATO’s answers to these tests comprised Issue-Based Arguments
as well as basic argument moves in isolation, although no arguments about the significance
of distinctions. CATO’s good grades on the Basic Argument Skills pre-test and post-test
provide some evidence that the Factor Hierarchy and CATO’s Issue-Based are successful
on small problems. Interestingly, the legal writing instructor said afterwards that he had not
been aware that one of the exams had been computer-generated or was somehow different
from the rest.
Although CATO’s Legal Memo-Writing Assignment did not receive a high grade,
reflecting the tougher standards used to grade the assignment, the legal writing instructor
did have a number of good things to say about CATO’s memo. Although this time he did
not think CATO’s arguments had been produced by one of his students, he was impressed
when it was revealed to him that the memo had been produced by a computer program (see
[1, p. 175]). He stated that CATO’s memo “did a very good job as far as thoroughness and
accuracy [are concerned].” He also said that he had used CATO’s memo to some extent to
guide his grading: “It was like to me a high-level outline of what was going on in those
cases.”
On the other hand, the legal writing instructor also stated that the analysis was “too
fragmented.” He found many statements “vague” or “conclusory” and often asked for
elaboration. He found that the argument was thorough but in a way that lacked judgment
as to what was most important. Also, he insisted on a different format for case-citing
arguments (“discuss case law first and then apply to our facts”) and a different top-level
organization. Clearly, these critiques imply that CATO’s Issue-Based Arguments were less
than ideal models for students to prepare for the Legal Memo-Writing Assignment.
In sum, as a component of the CATO program’s instruction, the Factor Hierarchy helped
achieve good results in teaching basic argumentation skills. Further, the legal writing
instructor’s comments that CATO’s argument was “accurate” and served for him as a
“high-level outline” confirm that the links of the Factor Hierarchy were relevant and
accurate. Many criticisms of CATO’s Issue-Based Arguments, such as a wrong choice of
top-level organization and of “fragmented discussion”, seem to be due mostly to a lack of
sophistication in its text-generation capabilities. But some criticisms also seem to point to
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limitations of the Factor Hierarchy itself. More of a synthesis of the various cases may be
required. Also, it may be necessary to discuss case facts in more detail. For this purpose,
the Factor hierarchy’s evidential links are important but may not be sufficient.
The two needs identified above, (a) for more holistic, integrated instruction, and (b)
for case synthesis, can to a large degree be addressed together. Issues, theory testing, and
argumentation should be integrated more tightly in the CATO instruction. There are, in
principle, important links between identifying issues, testing theories, and constructing
and organizing arguments. Theories induced from cases, such as the theories addressed
in the CATO instruction, can be cited as warrants in arguments about how a problem
situation should be decided. This link should be made more explicit during the CATO
instruction. The instruction should be organized so that students test theories in the context
of an argumentation task. From the start, the students should be involved in identifying
issues in a problem, identifying strengths and weaknesses related to each issue, formulating
alternative theories about whether and why those strengths outweigh the weaknesses,
and testing these theories by running queries. The CATO instruction should teach them
to present a theory and supporting cases in their arguments, producing the kind of case
synthesis called for by the legal writing instructor.
In order to support this kind of instruction, CATO’s Issue-Based Arguments would
need to be changed so that the discussion of an issue is centered around a theory. The
Factor Hierarchy will be instrumental in representing theories and their links with issues.
Importantly, the Factor Hierarchy would help in exploring theories at different levels of
abstraction, which is a desirable property [20]. The Factor Hierarchy could also be used to
suggest variations of a theory that are stronger or weaker, by adding or removing relevant
factors.8
It will also be very useful to explore ways of combining instruction with CATO and
more holistic instruction. For example, a human instructor could demonstrate how to carry
out theory-testing or argumentation tasks with CATO in front of a class of students, using
a data projector to project CATO’s output onto a big screen. In doing so, the instructor
could bring up and illustrate a rich set of connections between the components of CATO’s
argumentation model or cases retrieved from its database, going beyond the connections
that CATO itself is capable of making. A skilled instructor could also make connections
with knowledge about substantive law, arguments, and argumentation techniques not
represented in CATO.9 Following such classroom sessions, the students could use CATO in
8 A recent paper formalized notions of reasoning with factors, cases, values, and theories, viewing case-based
reasoning as a process of searching a space of factor-based theories [16].
9 For example, CATO currently does not represent the policies underlying trade secrets law. Nonetheless, it is
a suitable vehicle to bring up and illustrate some of these policies. During two classroom sessions unrelated to the
experiment described in the current paper, a law professor (Kevin Ashley) used CATO queries to illustrate two
of the policies underlying trade secrets law and to illustrate how they differ from the policies underlying other
areas of intellectual property law, such as patent law. (CATO’s output was projected onto a projection screen by
means of a data projector.) The requirement that information must be substantially secret in order to be protected
as a trade secret can be illustrated for example by running a query for cases with factor F20 Info-Known-To-
Competitors. This query returns only cases in which the defendant won (at least it did so at the time). The fact
that, apparently, plaintiffs in trade secrets cases cannot win if the alleged trade secret is known outside their
business illustrates a difference with patent law, since patented information is in the public domain. A second
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the lab to solidify their understanding. It may be effective also to use CATO in the context
of moot court sessions, given that the control group moot court sessions generated great
enthusiasm. For example, students could use CATO to prepare their oral arguments.10
10. Conclusion
Researchers in the field of AI and Law have long been interested in modeling the ways
in which attorneys use cases in arguments. We have presented a model of case-based
legal argumentation, the CATO model, which focuses on the representation of middle-
level normative background knowledge and the use of this knowledge for purposes of
case selection and argumentation. We have described and illustrated a Factor Hierarchy, a
novel knowledge source implemented in the CATO program which represents knowledge
about the meaning of the factors that are used to represent cases. We have described
and illustrated novel methods for using background knowledge (1) to organize multi-case
arguments by issues, (2) to generate context-sensitive arguments about the similarity of
cases, which focus on alternative characterizations of a distinction’s significance, and (3)
to assess the similarity of cases in order to select the best cases to cite in an argument. We
have described how the model can be used as a central component of an effective intelligent
learning environment designed to provide instruction in basic argumentation skills.
The first evaluation study presented in this paper provides evidence that CATO’s
arguments about the significance of distinctions are sound. The results show that, compared
to standard CBR methods that do not rely on background knowledge, CBR methods
that apply background knowledge to reason about the significance of distinctions help
to make better predictions of the outcome of trade secrets cases. They make it possible
to assess the similarity of cases in a more discriminating manner. The results of the
CATO query illustrated a second difference between the polices underlying the two areas of the law. The fact
that trade secrets law does not aim to protect owners of secret information against competitors who develop that
information independently can be illustrated by running a query for cases with factor F17 Info-Independently-
Generated. That query returns only cases won by the defendant. Patent law on the other hand does protect against
independent re-invention. This kind of demonstration with the CATO program is powerful and illustrates to
beginning law students the importance of cases in legal reasoning. Using a standard information retrieval system,
it would not have been feasible to carry out this kind of exercise, for the same reasons that theory-testing exercises
would be much harder to do with a standard legal information retrieval system. The exercise would have bogged
down in the complexity of trying to figure out what the retrieved cases mean.
A proposal for integrating reasoning about the policies or purposes underlying trade secrets law into
the HYPO/CATO model was presented by Berman and Hafner [17]. Since this critique was published, a
computational model [51] and a theoretical account [16] of relations between principles and cases have been
published.
10 During one of the classroom sessions mentioned above, we saw that CATO can help generate a considerable
amount of excitement among beginning law students when used in a context that resembles a moot court. CATO
was used to explore a legal issue that the students had been hotly debating as part of an assignment in a related
class. The issue involved the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor, an area for which
CATO has a small Case Database. Guided by the professor, the students formulated CATO queries to test some
of the theories they had debated with their peers. They cheered as their queries turned up cases confirming their
theories and turned up no counterexamples. Again, this exercise would not have been practical using a standard
legal information retrieval system.
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experiment suggest, although they do not prove conclusively, that the same improvement
could not have been obtained with simpler CBR methods that take into account whether
distinctions between cases exist, but do not reason about their significance and do not
apply background knowledge. The predictions based on the CBR methods were not as
good as those obtained by one of the inductive learning methods that was tested, Naïve
Bayes. This result may to some degree be attributed to the fact that Naïve Bayes is not
required to provide arguments to support its decisions and thus has more freedom in how
it uses the available information to make predictions. But the result suggests also that
it is worthwhile to continue to look for better ways of applying normative background
knowledge within a CBR framework. Regardless, it is a significant outcome that the use
of background knowledge in CBR methods leads to better predictions, compared to CBR
methods that do not apply background knowledge Apparently, CATO’s arguments about
the significance of distinctions bear some relation to the way legal cases are decided,
which inspires confidence that these arguments are relevant and sound. Further, the results
of this evaluation study provide strong support for the claim that middle-level normative
background knowledge is an important component of case-based legal reasoning.
The second evaluation study provided evidence for the effectiveness of instruction with
the CATO program. We compared instruction with CATO to traditional legal writing
instruction given to very small groups of students led by an experienced legal writing
instructor. The results show that the students who worked with the CATO program
showed comparable learning gains as students who were instructed in a more traditional
manner. The experiment also showed that on a transfer task, a more complex legal
writing assignment, the students in the control group performed better than students who
had worked with CATO. These results indicate that in the legal domain, an intelligent
learning environment that provides example-based component-wise instruction is effective
in teaching basic argumentation skills but that more is needed to help students to transfer
these skills to a more complex context. The experiment also provides some evidence that
CATO’s Factor Hierarchy is sound. Arguments generated by CATO were deemed (by
the control group instructor) to be about as good as those of the best students, on tests
designed to measure basic argumentation skills. However, when graded according to the
tougher standards applied to the transfer task, CATO’s arguments did not fare so well. In
order to be more effective, the instruction with CATO must be re-organized to achieve a
better integration of argumentation, theory-testing, and case synthesis. We have described
in some detail how this integration might be achieved.
The research on CATO makes contributions to both the theoretical and the practical
research goals of the field of AI and Law. CATO’s theoretical contribution is a
demonstration that in areas of the law where cases are naturally represented in terms
of factors (and we have argued that there are many such areas), middle-level normative
background knowledge about the meaning of those factors is a key ingredient of case-
based legal argumentation. The examples, methods, and evaluation results presented in
the paper confirm and detail the central role that this type of knowledge plays in such
frequently-occurring argumentation tasks as organizing arguments by issues and evaluating
the significance of distinctions. It has even been argued that CATO’s use of background
knowledge is a step towards generating arguments based on the policies and purposes
underlying the given area of the law [6]; see also [17]. The practical contribution of the
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current work to the research field of AI and Law is a demonstration that a computational
model of case-based legal argumentation can be used effectively to provide computer-based
instruction to beginning law students. CATO is not the first intelligent tutoring system for
the legal domain, but it is unique in the extent to which it focuses on skills of argumentation
and reasoning with cases.
The novel methods for reasoning about the significance of differences presented in this
paper constitute a contribution to the research field of CBR as well. Similarity assessment
and explaining similarity are important concerns in CBR research. The current research
demonstrates novel ways in which (fairly weak) background knowledge can be used in a
context-sensitive manner for similarity assessment. CATO’s techniques are appropriate:
• in adversarial domains, where arguers justify conclusions about how a problem should
be classified by comparing it to past cases, and
• where abstract terms are available that bear on the overall decision or classification
of a problem and inform the significance of base-level similarities and differences of
cases, and
• where there is freedom in interpreting cases, so that an arguer can select from among
alternative (abstract) interpretations of cases based at least in part on the outcome being
argued for.
The main difference with existing CBR approaches to explaining similarity is that
CATO supports the exploration of opposite viewpoints of the significance of distinctions,
by characterizing and re-characterizing their meaning in more abstract terms. This kind
of dialectic approach, in which alternative viewpoints on the similarity of given cases are
explored, may have a place in other CBR applications as well. Unless a CBR program has
a means of checking the solutions that it proposes (and few CBR programs do), it makes
sense that it would look also at the plausibility of alternative solutions based on alternative
cases. For example, a program for estimating construction costs (for example, see [69])
might offer best-case and worst-case scenarios.
Finally, CATO’s main contribution to the field of AI and Education is a demonstration
that basic argumentation skills can be taught effectively in a component-wise, example-
based manner, by an instructional environment that employs a computational model of
case-based argumentation.
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